Reproduced Exploit

Premia — underwriter vaults write collateral into any factory-deployed pool

A Premia underwriter vault sells options and posts the collateral with IPool.writeFrom. The only check on the pool is that Premia's factory has deployed a contract for that strike and maturity. The factory will deploy a pool for any key. The pool does not need open interest, liquidity, or a previou…

Nov 2026•Arbitrum•logic•3 min read

Loss

WBTC call vault 3.64410382 WBTC, WETH call vault 43.472545677315167985 WETH, ARB call vault 46,215.4286163288…

Chain

Arbitrum

Category

logic

Date

Nov 2026

Source

Crypto Training

EVM Playground

Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync

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Source & credit. Crypto Training original detection and analysis (live Twitter/X security-alert intake — not from DeFiHackLabs). Standalone Foundry PoC, offline anvil_state.json, and full write-up: 2026-11-Premia_exp in the evm-hack-registry mirror.


Vulnerability classes: vuln/logic/missing-validation · vuln/defi/option-settlement Reproduction: the PoC compiles and runs in an isolated Foundry project at this project folder. Full verbose trace: output.txt. The trace forks Arbitrum at block 520,166,284 and [PASS] testExploit drains six underwriter vaults. The attacker receives 191.765701446000165594 ETH.


Key info#

LossWBTC call vault 3.64410382 WBTC, WETH call vault 43.472545677315167985 WETH, ARB call vault 46,215.428616328829808000 ARB, WBTC put vault 20,215.067131 USDC.e, WETH put vault 21,333.613826 USDC.e, ARB put vault 6,930.677768 USDC.e
Vault implementationUnderwriterVault 0xb539ff8563974d407fd6d717ff2f930e99093d21
Attacker0xbeba8cefd0d75d747c5ad966dc17c0bb60d84dbd
Attack contract0x577168c8c6fa937495c3d6961f1d7d734b2d785f
Attack txssetup 0xe3c263fcae544954367998e48e13112875cfd38a3b9a240e7818bb96313831f5, drain 0x64602cbbeba5d3c7a5e2cff4f98cc118886fc6051c56fa50458abec2c90441ac, drain 0xd7e8086df0570c5389ca27eb9bcdff290e810c094155b410a42e5bad2b3244ff
Chain / block / dateArbitrum / fork block 520,166,284 / 2026-11-01

TL;DR#

A Premia underwriter vault sells options and posts the collateral with IPool.writeFrom. The only check on the pool is that Premia's factory has deployed a contract for that strike and maturity. The factory will deploy a pool for any key. The pool does not need open interest, liquidity, or a previous trade.

The setup transaction sends 0.01 ETH and creates six empty pools through that factory. The next two transactions flash-borrow from Balancer and buy options from the WBTC, WETH, and ARB call and put vaults. Each vault writes its collateral into the attacker's pool. The pool's fee accounting then pays that collateral back to the attacker. The attacker finishes with 191.765701446000165594 ETH.

The check#

_getPoolAddress returns the factory address whenever isDeployed is true. _getQuoteInternal reverts only when the address is zero. The trade then calls writeFrom on that pool.

SOLIDITY
(address pool, bool isDeployed) = IPoolFactory(FACTORY).getPoolAddress(_poolKey);
return isDeployed ? pool : address(0);
SOLIDITY
quote.pool = _getPoolAddress(l, args.strike, args.maturity);
if (revertIfPoolNotDeployed && quote.pool == address(0)) revert Vault__OptionPoolNotListed();
SOLIDITY
IPool(quote.pool).writeFrom(address(this), msg.sender, size, referrer);

Diagrams#

sequenceDiagram participant A as Attacker participant F as Pool factory participant V as Underwriter vault participant P as Empty option pool A->>F: deploy six pools for chosen strikes A->>V: buy options, flash-borrowed V->>V: accept the pool because the factory deployed it V->>P: writeFrom, collateral moves in P->>A: fee claim pays the collateral back out

Remediation#

  1. Do not treat "the factory deployed this address" as proof the pool is a market the vault should underwrite.
  2. Require a vault-controlled allowlist of pool addresses, or require the pool to have been listed by the vault owner before writeFrom.
  3. Refuse writeFrom into a pool whose short and long supply are both zero and whose only counterparty is the buyer.

How to reproduce#

Offline, from this folder:

BASH
bash ../_shared/run-poc/run_poc.sh 2026-11-Premia_exp -vv

testExploit replays the setup call and both drain calls at their original blocks and timestamps. It asserts each vault's token loss and that the attacker's ETH balance rises.


Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

Alerts & third-party analyses

  • Web3Sec X hacked database: search.
  • Rekt leaderboard: search.
  • Solodit incident search: search.

These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.