Reproduced Exploit
Pennysia — executeSyncAttempt calls attacker calldata and pays out someone else's USDC
PennysiaSettlement is a swap router. Users approve it once so later swaps can pull the token they are selling. executeSwap tries caller-supplied routes. A SYNC route names a venue and raw callData. The contract calls that venue, then checks that its balance of spendAs went down and its balance of b…
Chain
Ethereum
Category
dependency
Date
Nov 2026
Source
DeFiHackLabs
EVM Playground
Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync
The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. Query opens a search over the trace: previous and next writes, balance changes and calls, breakpoints, and a diff of everything that changed between two steps. No backend, no live RPC.
Source & credit. Exploit reproduction, trace data, and analysis adapted from DeFiHackLabs by SunWeb3Sec — an open registry of reproduced on-chain exploits. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 2026-11-Pennysia_exp in the
evm-hack-registrymirror. Upstream DeFiHackLabs PoC:src/test/…/Pennysia_exp.sol.
Vulnerability classes: vuln/dependency/unsafe-external-call · vuln/access-control/missing-auth Reproduction: the PoC compiles and runs in an isolated Foundry project at this project folder. Full verbose trace: output.txt. The trace forks Ethereum mainnet at block 26,399,313 and
[PASS] testExploittakes 5,000 USDC.[PASS] testControlHonestTokenDoesNotPayrevertsAllSoftAttemptsFailedand leaves the victim untouched.
Key info#
| Profit | 5,000 USDC from one wallet that had already approved the settlement contract. The incident transaction also took 6.133489 USDC, 0.05 wstETH, and 101,000 YUNO from three other wallets. SlowMist put the combined loss near $5.1K |
| Settlement | PennysiaSettlement 0x3aad97e5a91b8e43b7dc830aceb004307678795e, verified, solc 0.8.36 |
| Victim in this replay | 0xf2ff84d45783bd64913903516fa44b419f266998 |
| Incident attacker | 0x813a5ab666adeba907548235fbac087642878300 |
| Incident tx | 0x2716c50e450272240f68f2827bcb4a336c2ac520951e0e530154566c295b732d, block 26,399,314 |
| Chain / block | Ethereum mainnet / fork block 26,399,313 / 2026-11-12 |
| Bug class | venue.call(callData) plus a spend check on a caller-chosen token |
TL;DR#
PennysiaSettlement is a swap router. Users approve it once so later swaps can pull the token they are selling. executeSwap tries caller-supplied routes. A SYNC route names a venue and raw callData. The contract calls that venue, then checks that its balance of spendAs went down and its balance of buyToken went up. Whatever buy-token increase it measures is paid to the caller.
Nothing requires the venue to be a DEX. The attacker sets the venue to USDC and the calldata to transferFrom(victim, settlement, 5000e6). The settlement contract is the caller, so the victim's old approval is spent and the USDC lands in the settlement contract. spendAs is a token the attacker just deployed. Its balanceOf returns a smaller number once that USDC arrives, so the spend check passes. The contract then transfers the 5,000 USDC to the attacker as if it were swap output.
An honest token, whose balance does not drop, makes the same route revert AllSoftAttemptsFailed. The victim's USDC does not move. The approval is not the bug. The bug is that the contract will call anything while it is the spender on those approvals.
The call#
Verified source, SettlementSync.executeSyncAttempt:
uint256 spendBefore = TokenLib.balanceOfStrict(spendAs);
(bool ok,) = venue.call{value: venueValue}(step.callData);
if (!ok) revert SyncAttemptFailed();
Diagrams#
Remediation#
- Allowlist venues. Do not accept arbitrary calldata from a contract that holds user approvals.
- Reject
transferFromand other third-party pull selectors even if a venue allowlist is added later. - Do not treat
balanceOfof a caller-chosen token as proof that a swap spent the input. - Users who approved
0x3aad97e5a91b8e43b7dc830aceb004307678795eshould revoke that approval. The team later setswapEnabledto false. Revocation is still what stops a later call.
How to reproduce#
Offline, from this folder:
bash ../_shared/run-poc/run_poc.sh 2026-11-Pennysia_exp -vv
testExploit asserts the victim loses 5,000 USDC and the exploit receives it. testControlHonestTokenDoesNotPay asserts the same route with an honest token reverts and the victim balance is unchanged.
Sources & further analysis#
Reproductions & code
- Standalone PoC + full trace: 2026-11-Pennysia_exp (evm-hack-registry mirror).
- Upstream DeFiHackLabs PoC:
Pennysia_exp.sol. - Attack transaction: view on explorer.
Alerts & third-party analyses
- DeFiHackLabs incident explorer: search "Pennysia".
- Web3Sec X hacked database: search.
- Rekt leaderboard: search.
- Solodit incident search: search.
These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.