Reproduced Exploit

TENDRIL — the 30% sell tax calls sellToken, which burns the pair before the seller's input arrives

TENDRIL taxes a non-privileged sell into its pair 30%. The tax is not only a fee. On every such transfer the token calls the pool controller's sellToken, and sellToken sells the controller's own TENDRIL into the pair and then burns about twice that amount out of the pair's TENDRIL reserve. There is…

Nov 2026•BNB Chain•defi•4 min read

EVM Playground

Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync

evm-hack-analyzer

The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. Query opens a search over the trace: previous and next writes, balance changes and calls, breakpoints, and a diff of everything that changed between two steps. No backend, no live RPC.

Loading fork state…

Source & credit. Exploit reproduction, trace data, and analysis adapted from DeFiHackLabs by SunWeb3Sec — an open registry of reproduced on-chain exploits. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 2026-11-TENDRIL_exp in the evm-hack-registry mirror. Upstream DeFiHackLabs PoC: src/test/…/TENDRIL_exp.sol.


Vulnerability classes: vuln/defi/fee-manipulation · vuln/oracle/spot-price · vuln/logic/missing-check Reproduction: the PoC compiles and runs in an isolated Foundry project at this project folder. Full verbose trace: output.txt. The trace forks BNB Chain at block 131,653,426 and [PASS] testExploit.


Key info#

Profit308,959.367543173232679069 USDT left on the exploit after repaying a 30,641,402 USDT flash take. The pair's USDT reserve ends under 1 USDT. Headline figures were about $555K drained from the pair
TENDRIL0xb1afdfd850da168f2cc9f742e11cdda5273973d2, verified
TENDRIL/USDT pair0x5de082471f2a9f01a61e467a32837dee830d99e0
Pool controller0xd00be871eb7a5cb8a69aea41e4c95affc92e54fe, unverified
Attacker EOA0xb81e4aafa347b27112b7f6f5de6cf7cd516021ff
Attacker contract0xc8cb6a2aa825a576e1470479046056fe414ee0f8, held the pre-bought TENDRIL
Exploit tx0xfdff4fba4327821c204af07944076ecaaee163a994398fdf4063d08712e40059
Flash sourcePancakeSwap Infinity Vault 0x238a358808379702088667322f80ac48bad5e6c4
Chain / blockBNB Chain / fork block 131,653,426 / 2026-11-04
Bug classA taxed transfer into the pair calls _poolControl.sellToken(amount), which dumps and controlburns the pair at the live spot with no reserve floor

TL;DR#

TENDRIL taxes a non-privileged sell into its pair 30%. The tax is not only a fee. On every such transfer the token calls the pool controller's sellToken, and sellToken sells the controller's own TENDRIL into the pair and then burns about twice that amount out of the pair's TENDRIL reserve. There is no price guard. It trusts the spot reserves.

The attacker flash-takes 30.64M USDT, buys TENDRIL through the unrestricted USDT-FLAP-TENDRIL route (the main pair blocks a direct buy), and skews the main pair with a 4.10M USDT buy that the token routes to the controller. The following taxed sell makes sellToken burn the pair down. The untaxed 70% of that same sell swaps against the burned reserve and takes the USDT.

The pre-held TENDRIL (about 3.306e28 wei) is a real balance on the attacker's contract at the fork block, moved with transfer. It is not minted. The secondary pool that produced it is already empty at this block, so the test cannot re-buy it atomically.

The hook#

From the verified token, as recovered in the PoC header:

SOLIDITY
} else if (to == _uniswapV2Pair) {
    if (from != _poolControl && from != _markControl) { tax = 30; }
}
if (tax > 0) {
    uint256 taxAmount = (amount * tax) / 100;
    _basicTransfer(from, _poolControl, taxAmount);
    IPancakeFactory(_poolControl).sellToken(amount); // auto-liquidation, no price guard
    amount -= taxAmount;
}

The playground marks the sell that triggers this hook:

SOLIDITY
// @> VULN: the taxed sell calls sellToken, which dumps and burns the pair before this input arrives
ROUTER.swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(
    TENDRIL.balanceOf(address(this)), 0, p3, address(this), block.timestamp
);

Diagrams#

sequenceDiagram participant A as Exploit participant V as Infinity Vault participant R as Pancake router participant C as Pool controller participant P as TENDRIL-USDT pair A->>V: lock and take 30.64M USDT A->>R: buy TENDRIL via FLAP A->>R: skew buy, output routed to controller R->>P: USDT in, TENDRIL to controller A->>R: sell all TENDRIL into the pair Note over P: 30 percent tax calls sellToken C->>P: dump controller TENDRIL and controlburn P->>A: USDT out against the burned reserve A->>V: repay 30.64M USDT and settle Note over A: about 308,959 USDT left

Remediation#

  1. Remove the external sellToken call from the transfer hook, or limit it to a keeper with a deadline and a minimum output.
  2. If an auto-sell stays, quote it against a reserve floor or a TWAP, and do not burn the pair below the reserves the in-flight swap still needs.
  3. Do not run the hook before the pair has accounted the seller's input.

How to reproduce#

Offline, from this folder:

BASH
bash ../_shared/run-poc/run_poc.sh 2026-11-TENDRIL_exp -vv

testExploit asserts the pair's USDT reserve is under 1 USDT and the exploit's profit is within 0.1% of 308,959.367 USDT.


Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

Alerts & third-party analyses

These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.