Reproduced Exploit
MORE Markets — flash loan borrows at a stale e-mode category
MORE is an Aave V3 fork. Pool.flashLoan copies the borrower's e-mode category into the flash-loan parameters before it runs the callback. A flash loan opened with interestRateMode = 2 does not ask for the tokens back. After the callback it books them as variable debt, and it checks that debt agains…
Loss
4,547,469.353476318970231022 WFLOW to the attacker in this transaction. The aWFLOW reserve falls by 5,924,534…
Chain
Other
Category
logic
Date
Nov 2026
Source
Crypto Training
EVM Playground
Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync
The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. Query opens a search over the trace: previous and next writes, balance changes and calls, breakpoints, and a diff of everything that changed between two steps. No backend, no live RPC.
Source & credit. Crypto Training original detection and analysis (live Twitter/X security-alert intake — not from DeFiHackLabs). Standalone Foundry PoC, offline
anvil_state.json, and full write-up: 2026-11-MORE_exp in theevm-hack-registrymirror.
Vulnerability classes: vuln/logic/stale-parameter · vuln/defi/liquidation Reproduction: the PoC compiles and runs in an isolated Foundry project at this project folder. Full verbose trace: output.txt. The trace forks Flow EVM at block 85,326,750 and
[PASS] testExploitmoves 4,547,469.353476318970231022 WFLOW to the attacker.
Key info#
| Loss | 4,547,469.353476318970231022 WFLOW to the attacker in this transaction. The aWFLOW reserve falls by 5,924,534.690155713161770772 WFLOW. Blockaid put the whole incident, across about eleven transactions, near $308K |
| Pool | MORE Pool 0xbc92aac2dbbf42215248b5688eb3d3d2b32f2c8d, proxy to Pool 0x91eb147463a84112a57dad27a180cdfdd628806b |
| Reserve | mFlowWFLOW aToken 0x02bf4bd075c1b7c8d85f54777eaaa3638135c059 |
| Attacker | 0xe1ea6f2365215389f9dcd50a51c974313bf6785c |
| Helper | 0x9a8cc604b3534eaa1a8627c1d6f6084857bf2765 |
| Attack tx | 0xdf9e3ed4858103569f684166d9833e1980b6ba96334c9a8ec172b4e2aa1d15d8, block 85,326,751 |
| Chain / block / date | Flow EVM / fork block 85,326,750 / 2026-11-16 |
TL;DR#
MORE is an Aave V3 fork. Pool.flashLoan copies the borrower's e-mode category into the flash-loan parameters before it runs the callback. A flash loan opened with interestRateMode = 2 does not ask for the tokens back. After the callback it books them as variable debt, and it checks that debt against the copied category.
The helper's callback calls setUserEMode(0) before that booking. The borrow is still allowed at the e-mode loan-to-value. liquidationCall then reads the live category, which is 0, so the position is under the normal liquidation threshold. Liquidation burns the ankrFLOW collateral and repays only as much WFLOW as that collateral covers. The unpaid WFLOW stays with the borrower and is withdrawn from the reserve.
One round of the traced call borrows 17,805,278.511233457984911430 WFLOW against 15,000,000 ankrFLOW, repays 17,318,726.216895982259318145 WFLOW, and seizes 14,915,094.339622641509433962 ankrFLOW. The helper repeats that on a fresh borrower until 4,547,469.353476318970231022 WFLOW has reached the attacker.
The calls#
Pool.flashLoan snapshots the category, then FlashLoanLogic books the debt with that snapshot. liquidationCall reads storage again.
userEModeCategory: _usersEModeCategory[onBehalfOf],
BorrowLogic.executeBorrow(
...
userEModeCategory: params.userEModeCategory,
userEModeCategory: _usersEModeCategory[user],
Diagrams#
Remediation#
- Read
_usersEModeCategoryagain after the flash-loan callback, and pass that value intoexecuteBorrow. - Do not open debt at an e-mode loan-to-value when the stored category is 0.
- A liquidation that seizes collateral must leave no debt the seized collateral did not pay for. Add a post-liquidation check that the user's health factor is at least 1, or that the debt decreased by the full borrowed amount when the caller just opened it.
How to reproduce#
Offline, from this folder:
bash ../_shared/run-poc/run_poc.sh 2026-11-MORE_exp -vv
testExploit calls the incident helper with the original calldata and asserts the attacker's WFLOW gain and the reserve's WFLOW loss.
Sources & further analysis#
Reproductions & code
- Standalone PoC + full trace: 2026-11-MORE_exp (evm-hack-registry mirror).
- Attack transaction: view on explorer.
Alerts & third-party analyses
These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.