Reproduced Exploit

MORE Markets — flash loan borrows at a stale e-mode category

MORE is an Aave V3 fork. Pool.flashLoan copies the borrower's e-mode category into the flash-loan parameters before it runs the callback. A flash loan opened with interestRateMode = 2 does not ask for the tokens back. After the callback it books them as variable debt, and it checks that debt agains…

Nov 2026•Other•logic•3 min read

Loss

4,547,469.353476318970231022 WFLOW to the attacker in this transaction. The aWFLOW reserve falls by 5,924,534…

Chain

Other

Category

logic

Date

Nov 2026

Source

Crypto Training

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Source & credit. Crypto Training original detection and analysis (live Twitter/X security-alert intake — not from DeFiHackLabs). Standalone Foundry PoC, offline anvil_state.json, and full write-up: 2026-11-MORE_exp in the evm-hack-registry mirror.


Vulnerability classes: vuln/logic/stale-parameter · vuln/defi/liquidation Reproduction: the PoC compiles and runs in an isolated Foundry project at this project folder. Full verbose trace: output.txt. The trace forks Flow EVM at block 85,326,750 and [PASS] testExploit moves 4,547,469.353476318970231022 WFLOW to the attacker.


Key info#

Loss4,547,469.353476318970231022 WFLOW to the attacker in this transaction. The aWFLOW reserve falls by 5,924,534.690155713161770772 WFLOW. Blockaid put the whole incident, across about eleven transactions, near $308K
PoolMORE Pool 0xbc92aac2dbbf42215248b5688eb3d3d2b32f2c8d, proxy to Pool 0x91eb147463a84112a57dad27a180cdfdd628806b
ReservemFlowWFLOW aToken 0x02bf4bd075c1b7c8d85f54777eaaa3638135c059
Attacker0xe1ea6f2365215389f9dcd50a51c974313bf6785c
Helper0x9a8cc604b3534eaa1a8627c1d6f6084857bf2765
Attack tx0xdf9e3ed4858103569f684166d9833e1980b6ba96334c9a8ec172b4e2aa1d15d8, block 85,326,751
Chain / block / dateFlow EVM / fork block 85,326,750 / 2026-11-16

TL;DR#

MORE is an Aave V3 fork. Pool.flashLoan copies the borrower's e-mode category into the flash-loan parameters before it runs the callback. A flash loan opened with interestRateMode = 2 does not ask for the tokens back. After the callback it books them as variable debt, and it checks that debt against the copied category.

The helper's callback calls setUserEMode(0) before that booking. The borrow is still allowed at the e-mode loan-to-value. liquidationCall then reads the live category, which is 0, so the position is under the normal liquidation threshold. Liquidation burns the ankrFLOW collateral and repays only as much WFLOW as that collateral covers. The unpaid WFLOW stays with the borrower and is withdrawn from the reserve.

One round of the traced call borrows 17,805,278.511233457984911430 WFLOW against 15,000,000 ankrFLOW, repays 17,318,726.216895982259318145 WFLOW, and seizes 14,915,094.339622641509433962 ankrFLOW. The helper repeats that on a fresh borrower until 4,547,469.353476318970231022 WFLOW has reached the attacker.

The calls#

Pool.flashLoan snapshots the category, then FlashLoanLogic books the debt with that snapshot. liquidationCall reads storage again.

SOLIDITY
userEModeCategory: _usersEModeCategory[onBehalfOf],
SOLIDITY
BorrowLogic.executeBorrow(
    ...
    userEModeCategory: params.userEModeCategory,
SOLIDITY
userEModeCategory: _usersEModeCategory[user],

Diagrams#

sequenceDiagram participant H as Helper participant B as Fresh borrower participant P as MORE Pool participant R as aWFLOW reserve H->>B: deploy and call B->>P: setUserEMode 1 B->>P: flash-borrow ankrFLOW and supply it B->>P: flash-borrow WFLOW as variable debt B->>P: setUserEMode 0 inside the callback Note over P: borrow is checked at the copied e-mode category B->>P: liquidationCall on itself P->>R: repay only the WFLOW the collateral covers Note over B: the unpaid WFLOW debt remains H->>H: forward the kept WFLOW to the attacker

Remediation#

  1. Read _usersEModeCategory again after the flash-loan callback, and pass that value into executeBorrow.
  2. Do not open debt at an e-mode loan-to-value when the stored category is 0.
  3. A liquidation that seizes collateral must leave no debt the seized collateral did not pay for. Add a post-liquidation check that the user's health factor is at least 1, or that the debt decreased by the full borrowed amount when the caller just opened it.

How to reproduce#

Offline, from this folder:

BASH
bash ../_shared/run-poc/run_poc.sh 2026-11-MORE_exp -vv

testExploit calls the incident helper with the original calldata and asserts the attacker's WFLOW gain and the reserve's WFLOW loss.


Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

Alerts & third-party analyses

  • Web3Sec X hacked database: search.
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  • Solodit incident search: search.

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