Reproduced Exploit

STBL: iRedeem keeps the amount slice and burns the remainder, so 60 USST pays for a 40 burn

split returns _A worth the user's _amt and _B worth the rest of the pool. iRedeem stores _A as the new pool NFT and passes _B to issuer.withdraw, but it only pulls and approves _amt USST. When _amt is 1 and the pool is 100, the issuer needs 99 and the allowance is 1, so redeem reverts. When _amt is…

Jun 2026•Ethereum•logic•4 min read

Loss

A 1 USST redeem reverts. A 60 USST redeem on a 100 pool burns 40 and leaves 20 USST in the redemption contract

Chain

Ethereum

Category

logic

Date

Jun 2026

Source

AuditVault

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Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 66734-stbl-redemption-coreiredeem-burns-the-wrong-split-slice-caus. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 66734-stbl-redemption-coreiredeem-burns-the-wrong-split-slice-caus_exp in the evm-hack-registry mirror.


Vulnerability classes: vuln/logic/incorrect-order-of-operations · vuln/logic/missing-allowance

Key info#

FieldValue
LossA 1 USST redeem reverts. A 60 USST redeem on a 100 pool burns 40 and leaves 20 USST in the redemption contract
Vulnerable contractRedemption.iRedeem
Attacker EOA0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111
Attack contractExploit
Attack txExploit.run()
Chain / block / dateEthereum model · block 0 · 2026-06
Compilersolc 0.8.27, cancun, optimizer 200
Bug classPool keeps _A worth _amt and withdraw burns _B worth poolSVN - _amt

TL;DR#

split returns _A worth the user's _amt and _B worth the rest of the pool. iRedeem stores _A as the new pool NFT and passes _B to issuer.withdraw, but it only pulls and approves _amt USST. When _amt is 1 and the pool is 100, the issuer needs 99 and the allowance is 1, so redeem reverts. When _amt is 60, the burn is 40, the user has paid 60, and 20 USST stays in the redemption contract. The pool NFT is the 60 slice the user meant to redeem.

Background#

Cyfrin's June 2026 STBL Ess review, reported by Stalin. The blamed function is STBL_Redemption_Core.iRedeem. The fix, commit f6a7fe7, keeps _B as the pool and withdraws _A, and approves the burned slice's stableValueNet. Cyfrin verified that change.

The vulnerable code#

SOLIDITY
(uint256 a, uint256 b) = yld.split(nftId, amt);
nftId = a; // @> VULN: pool keeps the `_amt` slice and withdraws the remainder
usst.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amt);
usst.approve(address(issuer), amt);
issuer.withdraw(b);
DIFF
- nftId = a;
- usst.approve(address(issuer), amt);
- issuer.withdraw(b);
+ nftId = b;
+ uint256 burned = yld.stableValueNet(a);
+ usst.approve(address(issuer), burned);
+ issuer.withdraw(a);

Root cause#

The slice kept by the pool and the slice passed to withdraw are swapped, and the allowance is the user input rather than the slice that is actually burned. Those two amounts are equal only at half the pool. Below that, the burn does not fit the allowance. Above that, the user overpays.

Preconditions#

  • A pool NFT with stableValueNet of 100 ether.
  • The redeemer holds USST and has approved the redemption contract.
  • No other attacker setup. The function fails on its own amounts.

Attack walkthrough#

  1. Deposit the 100 USST pool NFT.
  2. iRedeem(1 ether) splits 1 and 99, approves 1, and withdraw reverts. State rolls back.
  3. iRedeem(60 ether) splits 60 and 40, pulls 60, and burns 40.
  4. The redemption contract holds 20 USST. The pool id is worth 60. The user's USST balance is 0.

Diagrams#

flowchart TD A["Pool NFT is worth 100 USST"] --> B["split mints _A worth _amt and _B worth the rest"] B --> C["VULN: pool keeps _A and withdraw gets _B"] C --> D["Allowance is only _amt"] D --> E["1 USST redeem reverts"] D --> F["60 USST redeem burns 40 and leaves 20"]

Impact#

Every redeem under half the pool reverts, which is the report's denial of service. A redeem of 60 on a pool of 100 takes 20 USST more than it burns. The user pays 60 and the burned slice is worth 40. Burning the _amt slice would leave an overpayment of 0.

Remediation#

Keep the remainder as the pool NFT, withdraw the _amt slice, and approve that slice's stableValueNet. Reset the allowance after the burn.

How to reproduce#

BASH
cd 66734-stbl-redemption-coreiredeem-burns-the-wrong-split-slice-caus_exp
forge test -vv

test_small_redeem_reverts_and_large_redeem_overpays asserts the 1 ether revert, overpaid == 20 ether, lastBurned == 40 ether, and the pool id worth 60 ether. test_control_burning_the_amt_slice_leaves_nothing asserts a matched burn overpays 0.

Sources#


Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

Alerts & third-party analyses

  • Web3Sec X hacked database: search.
  • Rekt leaderboard: search.
  • Solodit incident search: search.

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