Reproduced Exploit
Regnum Aurum: anyone can send NFT mint fees to veRAAC instead of the corp
claimNFTUnderlying and claimCollectorRewards have nonReentrant and whenNotPaused and no owner check. The caller passes feeType. ROYALTY_FEE forwards the pulled tokens to veRAAC. CORP_REVENUE would forward them to RAAC corp. A caller claims 100,000 crvUSD of NFT mint fees as ROYALTY_FEE. veRAAC rece…
Loss
100,000 crvUSD of NFT mint fees paid to veRAAC. RAAC corp receives 0
Chain
Ethereum
Category
access-control
Date
Jun 2025
Source
AuditVault
EVM Playground
Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync
The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. Query opens a search over the trace: previous and next writes, balance changes and calls, breakpoints, and a diff of everything that changed between two steps. No backend, no live RPC.
Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 66509-h-08-access-control-missing-on-fee-functions-enables-misuse. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 66509-h-08-access-control-missing-on-fee-functions-enables-misuse_exp in the
evm-hack-registrymirror.
Vulnerability classes:
vuln/access-control/missing-auth·vuln/defi/fee-manipulation
Key info#
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Loss | 100,000 crvUSD of NFT mint fees paid to veRAAC. RAAC corp receives 0 |
| Vulnerable contract | FeeCollector.claimNFTUnderlying |
| Attacker EOA | 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 |
| Attack contract | Exploit |
| Attack tx | Exploit.run() |
| Chain / block / date | Ethereum model · block 0 · 2025-06 |
| Compiler | solc 0.8.27, cancun, via IR |
| Bug class | Permissionless claim, caller-chosen feeType |
TL;DR#
claimNFTUnderlying and claimCollectorRewards have nonReentrant and whenNotPaused and no owner check. The caller passes feeType. ROYALTY_FEE forwards the pulled tokens to veRAAC. CORP_REVENUE would forward them to RAAC corp. A caller claims 100,000 crvUSD of NFT mint fees as ROYALTY_FEE. veRAAC receives 100,000. The corp receives 0. An owner-only collector ignores the caller's fee type and pays the corp.
Background#
Pashov Audit Group, Regnum Aurum review dated 2025-06-26, finding H-08. The report's example is 100,000 crvUSD of NFT mint fees meant for the RAAC corp revenue pool. Front-running the claim with ROYALTY_FEE accounts those fees to veRAAC holders instead.
The vulnerable code#
function claimNFTUnderlying(address _token, address target, uint256 amount, bytes32 feeType)
external
nonReentrant
whenNotPaused
returns (bool)
{
return _pullAndSplit(_token, target, amount, feeType);
}
// @> VULN: no onlyOwner. The caller-supplied feeType chooses who receives the fees.
if (feeType == ROYALTY_FEE) {
require(CrvUsd(_token).transfer(veRaac, amount), "ve");
}
The owner-only collector drops the caller's fee type and always pays the corp:
- function claimNFTUnderlying(...) external nonReentrant whenNotPaused returns (bool)
+ function claimNFTUnderlying(...) external returns (bool) {
+ require(msg.sender == owner, "owner");
+ // pay corp, ignore feeType
Root cause#
The fee split is an argument. The function that applies it is external. Whitelisting the target does not constrain who may choose the split.
Preconditions#
- The NFT fee source is whitelisted and holds 100,000 crvUSD.
- The source has approved the collector for that amount.
ROYALTY_FEEpays veRAAC.CORP_REVENUEpays the corp.
Attack walkthrough#
- The source is funded with 100,000 crvUSD and approves the collector.
- The attacker calls
claimNFTUnderlyingwithROYALTY_FEEand amount 100,000. - The collector pulls 100,000 crvUSD from the source.
- The royalty branch transfers all of it to veRAAC.
- The corp balance stays 0 and the source is empty.
- The control is
onlyOwner. A stranger'sROYALTY_FEEcall reverts. The owner claim pays the corp 100,000 even if the passed fee type isROYALTY_FEE.
Diagrams#
Impact#
veRAAC receives 100,000 crvUSD that the report assigns to the RAAC corp revenue pool. The corp balance is 0. The source cannot be claimed a second time. The owner-only control pays that 100,000 to the corp and rejects the same call from any other address.
Remediation#
Restrict claimCollectorRewards and claimNFTUnderlying to the fee operator. Do not let the caller select a fee type that changes the beneficiary of funds already collected for a different purpose.
How to reproduce#
cd 66509-h-08-access-control-missing-on-fee-functions-enables-misuse_exp
forge test -vv
test_exploit_royalty_fee_takes_corp_crvusd asserts veRAAC holds 100,000 crvUSD and the corp holds 0. test_control_only_owner_pays_corp asserts a stranger reverts and the owner pays the corp 100,000. Captured output is output.txt.
Sources#
- AuditVault finding: https://github.com/Auditware/AuditVault/blob/main/findings/66509-h-08-access-control-missing-on-fee-functions-enables-misuse.md
- Pashov report: https://github.com/pashov/audits/blob/master/team/md/RegnumAurum-security-review_2025-06-26.md
Sources & further analysis#
Reproductions & code
- Standalone PoC + full trace: 66509-h-08-access-control-missing-on-fee-functions-enables-misuse_exp (evm-hack-registry mirror).
- AuditVault finding: 66509-h-08-access-control-missing-on-fee-functions-enables-misuse.
Alerts & third-party analyses
These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.