Reproduced Exploit
Regnum Aurum: anyone can pull a FeeCollector allowance
This is the same FeeCollector.collectFee bug as AuditVault 66189, filed again under id 66368. borrowWithInsurance tells the user to approve the insurance fee to the collector. collectFee is public and pulls target for amount. The attacker names the victim and takes 1000 USDC. The victim never borro…
Loss
1000 USDC pulled from a victim who only approved an insurance fee
Chain
Ethereum
Category
access-control
Date
May 2025
Source
AuditVault
EVM Playground
Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync
The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. Query opens a search over the trace: previous and next writes, balance changes and calls, breakpoints, and a diff of everything that changed between two steps. No backend, no live RPC.
Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 66368-h-27-unrestricted-feecollectorcollectfee-enables-unauthorize. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 66368-h-27-unrestricted-feecollectorcollectfee-enables-unauthorize_exp in the
evm-hack-registrymirror.
Vulnerability classes:
vuln/access-control/missing-auth·vuln/logic/missing-check
Key info#
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Loss | 1000 USDC pulled from a victim who only approved an insurance fee |
| Vulnerable contract | FeeCollector.collectFee |
| Attacker EOA | 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 |
| Attack contract | Exploit |
| Attack tx | Exploit.run() |
| Chain / block / date | Ethereum model · block 0 · 2025-05 |
| Compiler | solc 0.8.27, cancun, via IR |
| Bug class | collectFee transferFroms an arbitrary target with no caller check |
TL;DR#
This is the same FeeCollector.collectFee bug as AuditVault 66189, filed again under id 66368. borrowWithInsurance tells the user to approve the insurance fee to the collector. collectFee is public and pulls target for amount. The attacker names the victim and takes 1000 USDC. The victim never borrows.
The vulnerable code#
MockUSDC(token).transferFrom(target, address(this), amount); // @> VULN
Pull the fee inside borrowWithInsurance instead of leaving a standing allowance that any caller can spend.
Root cause#
The allowance is granted to the collector, and the collector spends it for any caller. The fee-type and supported-token checks do not restrict msg.sender.
Preconditions#
- USDC is supported and the insurance fee type is registered.
- The victim has approved FeeCollector for 1000 USDC.
Attack walkthrough#
- The victim approves 1000 USDC to FeeCollector.
- The attacker calls
collectFeewith the victim astargetandkeccak256("INSURANCE_FEE"). transferFrommoves the 1000 USDC into the collector.- The victim's balance is 0 and the allowance is spent.
Diagrams#
Impact#
The victim loses 1000 USDC that they approved for a fee they were never charged. The tokens are held by FeeCollector. The same allowance cannot be used for the borrow that prompted it.
How to reproduce#
cd 66368-h-27-unrestricted-feecollectorcollectfee-enables-unauthorize_exp
forge test -vv
test_collectFee_pulls_victim_allowance asserts the victim's balance is 0 and the collector holds 1000 USDC.
Sources#
- AuditVault finding: https://github.com/Auditware/AuditVault/blob/main/findings/66368-h-27-unrestricted-feecollectorcollectfee-enables-unauthorize.md
- Pashov report: https://github.com/pashov/audits/blob/master/team/md/RegnumAurum-security-review_2025-05-06.md
Sources & further analysis#
Reproductions & code
- Standalone PoC + full trace: 66368-h-27-unrestricted-feecollectorcollectfee-enables-unauthorize_exp (evm-hack-registry mirror).
- AuditVault finding: 66368-h-27-unrestricted-feecollectorcollectfee-enables-unauthorize.
Alerts & third-party analyses
These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.