Reproduced Exploit

Regnum Aurum: a fake NFT target books 500 RAAC of fees and traps the real 100

claimNFTUnderlying calls target.withdrawUnderlying and, if the call does not revert, adds amount to the fee buckets. A fake pool returns success and sends no tokens. A 1000 RAAC claim books 500 RAAC for the treasury. The collector only holds 100 real RAAC, so distribute reverts and those 100 cannot…

May 2025•Ethereum•dos•3 min read

Loss

100 RAAC stuck in FeeCollector

Chain

Ethereum

Category

dos

Date

May 2025

Source

AuditVault

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Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 66364-h-23-feecollector-will-be-dos-pashov-audit-group-none-regnum. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 66364-h-23-feecollector-will-be-dos-pashov-audit-group-none-regnum_exp in the evm-hack-registry mirror.


Vulnerability classes: vuln/dos/frozen-funds · vuln/logic/fee-calculation

Key info#

FieldValue
Loss100 RAAC stuck in FeeCollector
Vulnerable contractFeeCollector.claimNFTUnderlying
Attacker EOA0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111
Attack contractExploit
Attack txExploit.run()
Chain / block / dateEthereum model · block 0 · 2025-05
Compilersolc 0.8.27, cancun, via IR
Bug classFee buckets credited from an unchecked target call

TL;DR#

claimNFTUnderlying calls target.withdrawUnderlying and, if the call does not revert, adds amount to the fee buckets. A fake pool returns success and sends no tokens. A 1000 RAAC claim books 500 RAAC for the treasury. The collector only holds 100 real RAAC, so distribute reverts and those 100 cannot leave. The control requires the balance to rise by amount, rejects the fake target, and pays the 100 out.

Background#

Pashov Audit Group's Regnum Aurum review of 2025-05-06, finding H-23. claimNFTUnderlying is permissionless aside from the pause and reentrancy guards. The low-level call ignores return data. Fee shares are 50 percent treasury, 20 percent repair, 10 percent burn, 10 percent veRAAC, 5 percent corp, and 5 percent other.

The vulnerable code#

SOLIDITY
(bool success,) = target.call(
    abi.encodeWithSelector(bytes4(keccak256("withdrawUnderlying(address,address,uint256)")), token, address(this), amount)
);
if (!success) revert ClaimCollectorUnderlyingFailed();
// @> VULN: treasuryAmount is credited even though the target transferred no tokens
collectedFee.treasuryAmount += treasuryAmount;

Root cause#

Success of the call is treated as delivery of amount. A contract that implements the selector and transfers nothing still inflates every fee bucket. Distribution then asks for more tokens than the contract holds.

Preconditions#

  • The token is supported and the lending fee type sums to 100 percent.
  • 100 RAAC of real fees have been pulled into the collector.
  • Anyone can pass an arbitrary target and a non-zero amount.

Attack walkthrough#

  1. 100 RAAC is minted and approved to the collector.
  2. receiveFees pulls that 100. The books are still zero.
  3. claimNFTUnderlying aims 1000 RAAC at the fake pool.
  4. The fake pool returns true. The RAAC balance stays 100.
  5. treasuryAmount becomes 500.
  6. distribute tries to send 500 and reverts.
  7. The 100 RAAC is still on the collector.

Diagrams#

flowchart TD A["100 real RAAC sits on FeeCollector"] --> B["claimNFTUnderlying targets a fake pool for 1000"] B --> C["Fake withdrawUnderlying returns success and sends 0"] C --> D["VULN credits treasuryAmount by 500"] D --> E["distribute asks for 500 and reverts"] E --> F["The 100 RAAC cannot leave"] B --> G["Control requires the balance to rise by amount"] G --> H["Control pays the 100 out"]

Impact#

FeeCollector holds 100 RAAC and a treasury payable of 500 RAAC. The payout reverts, so the real fees are frozen. The control rejects the fake claim and transfers the 100 RAAC to the treasury.

Remediation#

After the call, require balanceOf(address(this)) to increase by amount, and allow only known pool targets. Do not credit a bucket for tokens that did not arrive.

How to reproduce#

BASH
cd 66364-h-23-feecollector-will-be-dos-pashov-audit-group-none-regnum_exp
forge test -vv

test_exploit_inflated_fees_lock_100_raac asserts a 100 RAAC balance, a 500 treasury book, and a reverted distribute. test_control_balance_check_lets_real_fees_distribute asserts the fake claim reverts and the 100 is paid. Captured output is output.txt.

Sources#


Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

Alerts & third-party analyses

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  • Solodit incident search: search.

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