Reproduced Exploit

Securitize: bridging one wei past u64 burns the tokens and Solana mints nothing

The EVM bridge abi-encodes _value as a uint256, publishes the Wormhole payload, and then burns that amount. Solana decodes the same field with u64::try_from. type(uint64).max + 1 passes every EVM check and fails the Solana narrowing, so executeVaa returns false and minted stays 0. The burn sink hol…

Apr 2026•Ethereum•bridge•4 min read

Loss

type(uint64).max + 1 DS tokens burned. Solana mints 0

Chain

Ethereum

Category

bridge

Date

Apr 2026

Source

AuditVault

EVM Playground

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Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 65889-evm-to-solana-transfers-can-permanently-burn-tokens-by-produ. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 65889-evm-to-solana-transfers-can-permanently-burn-tokens-by-produ_exp in the evm-hack-registry mirror.


Vulnerability classes: vuln/bridge/missing-validation · vuln/data/wrong-encoding

Key info#

FieldValue
Losstype(uint64).max + 1 DS tokens burned. Solana mints 0
Vulnerable contractSecuritizeBridge._bridgeDSTokensInternal
Attacker EOA0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 (the bridging user)
Attack contractExploit
Attack txExploit.run()
Chain / block / dateEthereum model · block 0 · 2026-04
Compilersolc 0.8.27, cancun, via IR
Bug classuint256 payload value is burned before the Solana u64 decoder can reject it

TL;DR#

The EVM bridge abi-encodes _value as a uint256, publishes the Wormhole payload, and then burns that amount. Solana decodes the same field with u64::try_from. type(uint64).max + 1 passes every EVM check and fails the Solana narrowing, so executeVaa returns false and minted stays 0. The burn sink holds 18446744073709551616 tokens. The user's balance is 0. A value of 1000, which fits in a u64, is burned and minted.

Background#

Cyfrin's 30 April 2026 Securitize Solana Bridge review, reported by JesJupyter. SecuritizeBridge._bridgeDSTokensInternal builds the payload with abi.encode and burns _dsToken afterwards. The Solana program in payload.rs narrows value to u64 and rejects the VAA when that fails. Securitize acknowledged the value cap: the EVM side will reject amounts above type(uint64).max before the burn when the destination is Solana.

The vulnerable code#

SOLIDITY
bytes memory encoded = _encodePayload(
    _targetChain, _value, bytes32(uint256(uint160(msg.sender))), _destinationAddress, detail
);
uint64 sequence = wormholeCore.publishMessage(0, encoded, 1);
dsToken.burn(msg.sender, _value, BRIDGE_REASON); // @> VULN: burn runs even when Solana cannot decode _value

_encodePayload writes _value with abi.encode, which is 32 bytes. The Solana side of this reduction is the check the report quotes:

SOLIDITY
if (value > type(uint64).max) return false;

Cap the amount before publishMessage and before burn:

DIFF
+ if (_value > type(uint64).max) revert();
  uint64 sequence = wormholeCore.publishMessage(0, encoded, 1);
  dsToken.burn(msg.sender, _value, BRIDGE_REASON);

Root cause#

The source chain accepts a wider integer than the destination chain can decode, and it burns on the source before the destination has accepted the payload. The VAA can be valid as a Wormhole message and still be permanently unexecutable on Solana. Retrying does not change the encoded integer.

Preconditions#

  • The user holds at least type(uint64).max + 1 DS tokens. That amount is 18446744073709551616.
  • The target chain is the Solana id whose decoder narrows value to u64.
  • No EVM check caps _value at type(uint64).max before the burn.

Attack walkthrough#

  1. The user calls bridgeDSTokensToAddress with _value = type(uint64).max + 1.
  2. _encodePayload abi-encodes that uint256. publishMessage stores the payload and returns sequence 1.
  3. burn subtracts the full amount from the user and credits the burn sink.
  4. executeVaa decodes the payload. value > type(uint64).max, so it returns false and does not add to minted.
  5. The user's balance is 0. minted is 0. The sink holds the full amount.
  6. The control bridges 1000 instead. The decoder accepts it and minted becomes 1000.

Diagrams#

flowchart TD A["User bridges type uint64 max plus 1 DS tokens"] --> B["abi.encode writes the value as a uint256"] B --> C["Wormhole publishMessage stores the payload"] C --> D["VULN the bridge burns the full amount on EVM"] D --> E["Solana u64 try_from rejects the value"] E --> F["minted stays 0 and the burn sink holds the tokens"]

Impact#

The user loses type(uint64).max + 1 DS tokens. Solana mints nothing, and the same payload will fail the decoder on every retry. The burn is final. A transfer of 1000, inside the u64 range, is burned on EVM and minted on the Solana model, which is the path the cap is meant to keep.

Remediation#

Before publishing or burning, reject _value above type(uint64).max when the destination is Solana. Securitize acknowledged that cap. The same rule applies to attribute widths and to the 1024-byte payload limit; this run demonstrates the value-overflow path from the report.

How to reproduce#

BASH
cd 65889-evm-to-solana-transfers-can-permanently-burn-tokens-by-produ_exp
forge test -vv

test_exploit_u64_overflow_burns_with_no_solana_mint asserts the decoder rejects, minted is 0, and the sink holds type(uint64).max + 1. test_control_value_inside_u64_mints_on_solana asserts a 1000-token bridge mints 1000. Captured output is output.txt.

Sources#


Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

Alerts & third-party analyses

  • Web3Sec X hacked database: search.
  • Rekt leaderboard: search.
  • Solodit incident search: search.

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