Reproduced Exploit
Securitize: bridging one wei past u64 burns the tokens and Solana mints nothing
The EVM bridge abi-encodes _value as a uint256, publishes the Wormhole payload, and then burns that amount. Solana decodes the same field with u64::try_from. type(uint64).max + 1 passes every EVM check and fails the Solana narrowing, so executeVaa returns false and minted stays 0. The burn sink hol…
Loss
type(uint64).max + 1 DS tokens burned. Solana mints 0
Chain
Ethereum
Category
bridge
Date
Apr 2026
Source
AuditVault
EVM Playground
Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync
The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. Query opens a search over the trace: previous and next writes, balance changes and calls, breakpoints, and a diff of everything that changed between two steps. No backend, no live RPC.
Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 65889-evm-to-solana-transfers-can-permanently-burn-tokens-by-produ. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 65889-evm-to-solana-transfers-can-permanently-burn-tokens-by-produ_exp in the
evm-hack-registrymirror.
Vulnerability classes:
vuln/bridge/missing-validation·vuln/data/wrong-encoding
Key info#
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Loss | type(uint64).max + 1 DS tokens burned. Solana mints 0 |
| Vulnerable contract | SecuritizeBridge._bridgeDSTokensInternal |
| Attacker EOA | 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 (the bridging user) |
| Attack contract | Exploit |
| Attack tx | Exploit.run() |
| Chain / block / date | Ethereum model · block 0 · 2026-04 |
| Compiler | solc 0.8.27, cancun, via IR |
| Bug class | uint256 payload value is burned before the Solana u64 decoder can reject it |
TL;DR#
The EVM bridge abi-encodes _value as a uint256, publishes the Wormhole payload, and then burns that amount. Solana decodes the same field with u64::try_from. type(uint64).max + 1 passes every EVM check and fails the Solana narrowing, so executeVaa returns false and minted stays 0. The burn sink holds 18446744073709551616 tokens. The user's balance is 0. A value of 1000, which fits in a u64, is burned and minted.
Background#
Cyfrin's 30 April 2026 Securitize Solana Bridge review, reported by JesJupyter. SecuritizeBridge._bridgeDSTokensInternal builds the payload with abi.encode and burns _dsToken afterwards. The Solana program in payload.rs narrows value to u64 and rejects the VAA when that fails. Securitize acknowledged the value cap: the EVM side will reject amounts above type(uint64).max before the burn when the destination is Solana.
The vulnerable code#
bytes memory encoded = _encodePayload(
_targetChain, _value, bytes32(uint256(uint160(msg.sender))), _destinationAddress, detail
);
uint64 sequence = wormholeCore.publishMessage(0, encoded, 1);
dsToken.burn(msg.sender, _value, BRIDGE_REASON); // @> VULN: burn runs even when Solana cannot decode _value
_encodePayload writes _value with abi.encode, which is 32 bytes. The Solana side of this reduction is the check the report quotes:
if (value > type(uint64).max) return false;
Cap the amount before publishMessage and before burn:
+ if (_value > type(uint64).max) revert();
uint64 sequence = wormholeCore.publishMessage(0, encoded, 1);
dsToken.burn(msg.sender, _value, BRIDGE_REASON);
Root cause#
The source chain accepts a wider integer than the destination chain can decode, and it burns on the source before the destination has accepted the payload. The VAA can be valid as a Wormhole message and still be permanently unexecutable on Solana. Retrying does not change the encoded integer.
Preconditions#
- The user holds at least
type(uint64).max + 1DS tokens. That amount is18446744073709551616. - The target chain is the Solana id whose decoder narrows
valuetou64. - No EVM check caps
_valueattype(uint64).maxbefore the burn.
Attack walkthrough#
- The user calls
bridgeDSTokensToAddresswith_value = type(uint64).max + 1. _encodePayloadabi-encodes thatuint256.publishMessagestores the payload and returns sequence 1.burnsubtracts the full amount from the user and credits the burn sink.executeVaadecodes the payload.value > type(uint64).max, so it returns false and does not add tominted.- The user's balance is 0.
mintedis 0. The sink holds the full amount. - The control bridges 1000 instead. The decoder accepts it and
mintedbecomes 1000.
Diagrams#
Impact#
The user loses type(uint64).max + 1 DS tokens. Solana mints nothing, and the same payload will fail the decoder on every retry. The burn is final. A transfer of 1000, inside the u64 range, is burned on EVM and minted on the Solana model, which is the path the cap is meant to keep.
Remediation#
Before publishing or burning, reject _value above type(uint64).max when the destination is Solana. Securitize acknowledged that cap. The same rule applies to attribute widths and to the 1024-byte payload limit; this run demonstrates the value-overflow path from the report.
How to reproduce#
cd 65889-evm-to-solana-transfers-can-permanently-burn-tokens-by-produ_exp
forge test -vv
test_exploit_u64_overflow_burns_with_no_solana_mint asserts the decoder rejects, minted is 0, and the sink holds type(uint64).max + 1. test_control_value_inside_u64_mints_on_solana asserts a 1000-token bridge mints 1000. Captured output is output.txt.
Sources#
- AuditVault finding: https://github.com/Auditware/AuditVault/blob/main/findings/65889-evm-to-solana-transfers-can-permanently-burn-tokens-by-produ.md
- Cyfrin report: https://github.com/solodit/solodit_content/blob/main/reports/Cyfrin/2026-04-30-cyfrin-securitize-solana-bridge-v2.1.md
- Vulnerable lines:
_bridgeDSTokensInternal,_encodePayload, and the Solanau64::try_fromsnippet quoted in that report. The finding does not name an audited commit.
Sources & further analysis#
Reproductions & code
- Standalone PoC + full trace: 65889-evm-to-solana-transfers-can-permanently-burn-tokens-by-produ_exp (evm-hack-registry mirror).
- AuditVault finding: 65889-evm-to-solana-transfers-can-permanently-burn-tokens-by-produ.
Alerts & third-party analyses
These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.