stNXM — attacker profits by manipulating Uniswap liquidity via slot0

Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 64079-h-1-attacker-can-profit-by-manipulating-uniswap-liquidity-sh. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 64079-h-1-attacker-can-profit-by-manipulating-uniswap-liquidity-sh_exp in the evm-hack-registry mirror.

Reproduction: self-contained Foundry PoC (forge-std only) — no fork. Full trace: output.txt.

AuditVault taxonomy: lang/solidity · platform/sherlock · severity/high · vuln/oracle/spot-price · trigger/flash-loan · genome: spot-price · price-manipulation

Key info#


Impact	HIGH — Inflated ERC4626 withdrawal paid from free liquidity after same-tx Uniswap slot0 manipulation; residual stakers lose value
Protocol	stNXM by EaseDeFi
Bug class	dexBalances reads Uniswap V3 slot0 spot price to value LP inside totalAssets
Finding	Sherlock 0xpetern et al. (H-1) · #64079
Report	https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2025-11-stnxm-by-easedefi-judging
Source	AuditVault
Status	Audit finding — reproduced as a standalone local synthetic
Compiler	`^0.8.24` (PoC)

TL;DR#

dexBalances reads Uniswap V3 slot0 spot price to value LP inside totalAssets

HARM: Inflated ERC4626 withdrawal paid from free liquidity after same-tx Uniswap slot0 manipulation; residual stakers lose value

Root cause#

dexBalances reads Uniswap V3 slot0 spot price to value LP inside totalAssets

Preconditions#

Protocol-specific setup as described in the original finding (roles / managers / pending state in place).

Attack walkthrough#

See the synthetic test/64079-h-1-attacker-can-profit-by-manipulating-uniswap-liquidity-sh.sol and the Playground story beats. The @> VULN marker sits on the blamed executable line.

Diagrams#

sequenceDiagram participant A as Attacker participant P as Uniswap pool participant V as stNXM vault A->>V: requestWithdraw shares A->>P: large swap inflate reserve1 Note over V: slot0 spot price moves A->>V: withdrawFinalize V-->>A: inflated wNXM payout

Impact#

Inflated ERC4626 withdrawal paid from free liquidity after same-tx Uniswap slot0 manipulation; residual stakers lose value

Sources#

AuditVault finding
Report: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2025-11-stnxm-by-easedefi-judging
Reduced source provenance: github.com/sherlock-audit/2025-11-stnxm-by-easedefi stNXM.sol dexBalances

Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

Standalone PoC + full trace: 64079-h-1-attacker-can-profit-by-manipulating-uniswap-liquidity-sh_exp (evm-hack-registry mirror).
AuditVault finding: 64079-h-1-attacker-can-profit-by-manipulating-uniswap-liquidity-sh.

Alerts & third-party analyses

Web3Sec X hacked database: search.
Rekt leaderboard: search.
Solodit incident search: search.

These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.

Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync