Reproduced Exploit

Strata Tranches — sUSDe withdrawers always incur a loss (inverted CDO params)

1. Withdraw of 100 sUSDe (worth 150 USDe at 1.5 rate) burns 150 JRT shares. 2. Tranche passes (baseAssets, tokenAssets) but CDO expects (tokenAmount, baseAssets). 3. Strategy runs previewWithdraw(tokenAssets) instead of previewWithdraw(baseAssets) → ~66.67 sUSDe out. 4. User permanently loses USDe…

Oct 2025Otheruntagged2 min read

Chain

Other

Category

untagged

Date

Oct 2025

Source

AuditVault

EVM Playground

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Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 63222-withdrawers-of-susde-always-incur-a-loss-because-parameters. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 63222-withdrawers-of-susde-always-incur-a-loss-because-parameters_exp in the evm-hack-registry mirror.


Vulnerability classes: wrong-order · indirect-loss · parameter-swap

Reproduction: self-contained Foundry PoC, forge-std only, no fork. Full trace: output.txt.

AuditVault taxonomy: severity/high · sector/oracle · sector/staking · platform/cyfrin · wrong-order · indirect-loss


Key info#

ImpactHIGH — withdrawer burns full Tranche shares but receives ~66% of requested sUSDe
ProtocolStrata Tranches v2.0
Vulnerable codeTranche::_withdrawcdo.withdraw(..., baseAssets, tokenAssets) inverted
Bug classSwapped call arguments
FindingCyfrin · Strata 2025-10-08 · #63222
ReportCyfrin Strata
Compiler^0.8.24

TL;DR#

  1. Withdraw of 100 sUSDe (worth 150 USDe at 1.5 rate) burns 150 JRT shares.
  2. Tranche passes (baseAssets, tokenAssets) but CDO expects (tokenAmount, baseAssets).
  3. Strategy runs previewWithdraw(tokenAssets) instead of previewWithdraw(baseAssets) → ~66.67 sUSDe out.
  4. User permanently loses USDe value relative to burned shares.

The vulnerable code#

SOLIDITY
cdo.withdraw(address(this), token, baseAssets, tokenAssets, receiver); // @> VULN inverted
// FIX: cdo.withdraw(address(this), token, tokenAssets, baseAssets, receiver);

Root cause#

Argument order mismatch between Tranche and CDO/Strategy withdraw APIs.

Preconditions#

  • sUSDe/USDe exchange rate ≠ 1 (after yield).
  • User withdraws sUSDe (not plain USDe).

Attack walkthrough#

  1. Bootstrap sUSDe rate to 1.5 via yield donation.
  2. Deposit 100 sUSDe → 150 JRT.
  3. Withdraw 100 sUSDe → all shares burned, ~66.67 sUSDe returned.

Diagrams#

sequenceDiagram participant User participant Tranche participant CDO participant Strategy User->>Tranche: withdraw 100 sUSDe Tranche->>Tranche: burn 150 JRT Tranche->>CDO: withdraw baseAssets then tokenAssets Note over CDO: args inverted CDO->>Strategy: previewWithdraw wrong base Strategy-->>User: ~66.67 sUSDe

Impact#

Every sUSDe withdrawal under-pays the user while burning full share entitlement.

Sources#


Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

Alerts & third-party analyses

  • Web3Sec X hacked database: search.
  • Rekt leaderboard: search.
  • Solodit incident search: search.

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