Reproduced Exploit

Ammplify — H-9: Parent borrow marks sibling but settle skips sibling mint

1. Taker demand on a child forces borrow from parent. 2. Sibling also receives preBorrow (parent liq = both children). 3. Settle walks only the op route (child+parent), not sibling. 4. Uniswap never mints sibling liq → accounting lies; price games steal funds.

Sep 2025Otheruntagged2 min read

Chain

Other

Category

untagged

Date

Sep 2025

Source

AuditVault

EVM Playground

Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync

evm-hack-analyzer

The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. No backend, no live RPC.

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Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 63175-h-9-liquidity-borrowed-from-or-repaid-to-parent-nodes-is-not. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 63175-h-9-liquidity-borrowed-from-or-repaid-to-parent-nodes-is-not_exp in the evm-hack-registry mirror.


Vulnerability classes: decimal-mismatch · fee-theft · price-manipulation

Reproduction: self-contained Foundry PoC with only forge-std. Full trace: output.txt.

AuditVault taxonomy: severity/high · sector/dex · platform/sherlock · fee-theft · data-corruption/price-manipulation


Key info#

ImpactHIGH — pool vs node accounting diverge; enables draining protocol balances
ProtocolAmmplify
Vulnerable codesolveLiq sets sibling.preBorrow but settle route omits sibling
Finding#63175 / issue 424 · anonymousjoe, blockace, panprog
Compiler^0.8.24

TL;DR#

  1. Taker demand on a child forces borrow from parent.
  2. Sibling also receives preBorrow (parent liq = both children).
  3. Settle walks only the op route (child+parent), not sibling.
  4. Uniswap never mints sibling liq → accounting lies; price games steal funds.

The vulnerable code#

SOLIDITY
sibling.preBorrow += borrow; // @> VULN: sibling not on settle route
sibling.dirty = true;
// FIX: second settle pass over siblings / include both children in route

Diagrams#

flowchart TD A["Borrow from parent for right child"] --> B["sibling.left preBorrow += amt"] B --> C["settle route = right + parent only"] C --> D["left never minted in pool"] D --> E["Accounting broken / drain path"]

Sources#


Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

Alerts & third-party analyses

  • Web3Sec X hacked database: search.
  • Rekt leaderboard: search.
  • Solodit incident search: search.

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