Reproduced Exploit
Etherspot: one session key spends another session key's claim balance
A smart wallet can hold several session keys. validateUserOp checks that the signer is one of them. _validateSingleCall then accepts claim() without reading the sessionKey argument. SK2 signs a claim that names SK1. Validation passes, the wallet executes it, and SK1's 1000 CLAIM is paid to SK2's re…
Loss
1000 CLAIM moved from SK1's session to SK2's recipient
Chain
Ethereum
Category
access-control
Date
Sep 2025
Source
AuditVault
EVM Playground
Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync
The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. Query opens a search over the trace: previous and next writes, balance changes and calls, breakpoints, and a diff of everything that changed between two steps. No backend, no live RPC.
Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 62848-h-01-sessionkey-owner-can-impersonate-another-session-key-ow. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 62848-h-01-sessionkey-owner-can-impersonate-another-session-key-ow_exp in the
evm-hack-registrymirror.
Vulnerability classes:
vuln/access-control/missing-modifier·vuln/auth/signature-validation
Key info#
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Loss | 1000 CLAIM moved from SK1's session to SK2's recipient |
| Vulnerable contract | CredibleAccountModule._validateSingleCall |
| Attacker EOA | 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 |
| Attack contract | Exploit |
| Attack tx | Exploit.run() |
| Chain / block / date | Ethereum model · block 0 · 2025-09 |
| Compiler | solc 0.8.27, cancun |
| Bug class | claim calldata is not bound to the signing session key |
TL;DR#
A smart wallet can hold several session keys. validateUserOp checks that the signer is one of them. _validateSingleCall then accepts claim() without reading the sessionKey argument. SK2 signs a claim that names SK1. Validation passes, the wallet executes it, and SK1's 1000 CLAIM is paid to SK2's recipient.
Background#
Shieldify's review of Etherspot's GasTank paymaster module, finding H-01. The blamed functions are _validateSelector and _validateSingleCall in CredibleAccountModule.sol at commit 9019f2a, lines 759-766. The report's scenario is two sessions on one wallet, with SK2 consuming SK1.
The vulnerable code#
function _validateSelector(bytes4 _selector) internal pure returns (bytes4) {
return (_selector == this.claim.selector || _selector == IERC20.approve.selector) ? _selector : bytes4(0);
}
function _validateSingleCall(bytes calldata _callData) internal view returns (bool) {
(address target,, bytes calldata execData) = ExecutionLib.decodeSingle(_callData[EXEC_OFFSET:]);
bytes4 selector = _validateSelector(bytes4(execData[0:4]));
if (selector == bytes4(0)) return false;
if (selector == IERC20.approve.selector) return true;
if (target != address(this)) return false;
return true; // @> VULN: claim() is accepted without sessionKey == sessionKeySigner
}
EXEC_OFFSET is 0 in this reduction. The outer bytes are the target, the value, and the inner calldata. The selector check and the final return true are the audited lines.
Root cause#
The validator proves that the signer belongs to the wallet. It does not prove that the signer is the session whose balance claim will spend. Any sibling session can name another session in the calldata.
Preconditions#
- One smart wallet has two session keys, SK1 and SK2.
- SK1's session balance is 1000 CLAIM. SK2's is zero.
- The user operation calls
claim(SK1, recipient)and is signed by SK2.
Attack walkthrough#
- Credit 1000 CLAIM to SK1 and register both keys on the wallet.
- Build claim calldata whose session argument is SK1 and whose recipient is
0x2222…2222. validateUserOp(SK2, calldata)sees that SK2 is a session of the wallet._validateSelectoracceptsclaim, the target is the module, and_validateSingleCallreturns true.- The wallet executes the calldata.
claimrequires the caller to be the wallet, which it is. - SK1's balance is zeroed and 1000 CLAIM arrives at the recipient. SK2's own session balance was never funded.
Diagrams#
Impact#
SK2 spends SK1's session. The recipient 0x2222…2222 receives 1000 CLAIM. SK1 did not sign, and SK2 had no claimable balance of its own. The report's impact is consumption of another session by an unauthorized session owner on the same wallet.
Remediation#
When the selector is claim, decode the sessionKey argument and require it to equal the signer. The team reported the check as fixed.
How to reproduce#
cd 62848-h-01-sessionkey-owner-can-impersonate-another-session-key-ow_exp
forge test -vv
test_sk2_consumes_sk1_claim asserts validation succeeded, the recipient holds 1000 CLAIM, and SK1's session balance is zero. Captured output is output.txt.
Sources#
- AuditVault finding: https://github.com/Auditware/AuditVault/blob/main/findings/62848-h-01-sessionkey-owner-can-impersonate-another-session-key-ow.md
- Report: https://github.com/shieldify-security/audits-portfolio-md/blob/main/Etherspot-GasTankPaymasterModule-Extended-Security-Review.md
- Blamed lines: https://github.com/etherspot/etherspot-modular-accounts/blob/9019f2a78c36e74bdb1df4029672998cb4631162/src/modules/validators/CredibleAccountModule.sol#L759-L766
Sources & further analysis#
Reproductions & code
- Standalone PoC + full trace: 62848-h-01-sessionkey-owner-can-impersonate-another-session-key-ow_exp (evm-hack-registry mirror).
- AuditVault finding: 62848-h-01-sessionkey-owner-can-impersonate-another-session-key-ow.
Alerts & third-party analyses
These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.