Reproduced Exploit
EigenLayer: the first-submission catch-up is paid on every press
generateHopperActions is a view. While block.timestamp <= firstSubmissionTriggerCutoff it sets amountsToUse = amounts * multiple and does not remember that this already happened. TokenHopper.pressButton uses that amount on every press. In this configuration the cooldown is 0, one interval is 1 seco…
Loss
Two presses pay 200 EIGEN. One catch-up is 100. The extra 100 is the second payment
Chain
Ethereum
Category
logic
Date
Mar 2025
Source
AuditVault
EVM Playground
Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync
The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. Query opens a search over the trace: previous and next writes, balance changes and calls, breakpoints, and a diff of everything that changed between two steps. No backend, no live RPC.
Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 53581-first-submission-can-be-triggered-multiple-times-sigmaprime. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 53581-first-submission-can-be-triggered-multiple-times-sigmaprime_exp in the
evm-hack-registrymirror.
Vulnerability classes:
vuln/logic/reward-calculation·vuln/logic/missing-check
Key info#
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Loss | Two presses pay 200 EIGEN. One catch-up is 100. The extra 100 is the second payment |
| Vulnerable contract | RewardAllStakersActionGenerator.generateHopperActions |
| Attacker EOA | 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 |
| Attack contract | Exploit |
| Attack tx | Exploit.run() |
| Chain / block / date | Ethereum model · timestamp 100 · 2025-03 |
| Compiler | solc 0.8.27, cancun, via IR |
TL;DR#
generateHopperActions is a view. While block.timestamp <= firstSubmissionTriggerCutoff it sets amountsToUse = amounts * multiple and does not remember that this already happened. TokenHopper.pressButton uses that amount on every press. In this configuration the cooldown is 0, one interval is 1 second, and the clock sits two intervals after the start and still inside the cutoff, so multiple is 2. Each press pays 100 EIGEN. Two presses pay 200. A hopper that records firstDone reverts the second press and pays 100 once.
The vulnerable code#
if (block.timestamp <= firstSubmissionTriggerCutoff) { // @> VULN: every press before the cutoff applies the catch-up multiple
uint32 multiple = (uint32(block.timestamp) - firstSubmissionStartTimestamp) / uint32(CALCULATION_INTERVAL_SECONDS);
amountsToUse0 = amounts0 * multiple;
firstBranch = true;
}
That is the report's branch. The live constants are one week and a deployment-time cutoff. Here one interval is 1 second so the same branch is observable in a single block: the constructor sets the start to block.timestamp - 2 and the cutoff to a year later. The replay pins block.timestamp at 100, which is also the forge test's vm.warp(100) before deploy. The cooldown is 0, the configuration the report says can admit more than one press before the cutoff.
Root cause#
The generator does not take an isFirstSubmission flag and the hopper does not store whether pressButton has already produced the catch-up. The cutoff timestamp is the only gate, and it stays open across presses.
Preconditions#
block.timestampis 100. The start is 98.CALCULATION_INTERVAL_SECONDSis 1.multipleis 2.cooldownis 0, so the second press in the same timestamp passestimestamp >= lastPress + cooldown.- The hopper holds at least 200 EIGEN. One interval's
amounts0is 50 EIGEN, so one catch-up is 100.
Attack walkthrough#
- The hopper is funded with 400 EIGEN.
- The first
pressButtontakes the cutoff branch and pays 100 EIGEN. - Nothing records that the first submission happened.
- The second
pressButtontakes the same branch and pays another 100. paidis 200 andpressesis 2.- The extra 100 is sent to the sink. The first 100 stays as the legitimate catch-up.
Diagrams#
Impact#
Stakers receive the catch-up multiple once per press instead of once per hopper. In this run that is 100 EIGEN too much. On the live weekly schedule the same bug pays weeksElapsed * weeklyAmount on every press that lands before the cutoff. EigenLayer closed it by requiring the hopper start to sit at most one week before the cutoff, so only one press fits, and by commit 9cf6f41.
Remediation#
Remember the first submission. The control hopper sets firstDone on the cutoff branch and the second pressButton reverts with already submitted. Only 100 EIGEN is paid.
How to reproduce#
cd 53581-first-submission-can-be-triggered-multiple-times-sigmaprime_exp
forge test -vv
test_exploit_first_submission_multiple_is_paid_twice asserts two presses, 200 EIGEN paid, and a 100 EIGEN sink balance. test_control_second_press_before_cutoff_reverts asserts the flagged hopper pays 100 and reverts the second press. Both tests warp to timestamp 100 before deploy.
Sources#
- AuditVault finding: https://github.com/Auditware/AuditVault/blob/main/findings/53581-first-submission-can-be-triggered-multiple-times-sigmaprime.md
- Sigma Prime report: https://github.com/sigp/public-audits/blob/master/reports/eigenlayer/Sigma_Prime_EigenLabs_EigenLayer_EIGEN_Rewards_Security_Assessment_Report_v2.0.pdf
- The finding quotes the cutoff check and
amountsToUse[0] = amounts[0] * multiple. The reduction keeps that expression. The public report file was committed on 2025-03-18.
Sources & further analysis#
Reproductions & code
- Standalone PoC + full trace: 53581-first-submission-can-be-triggered-multiple-times-sigmaprime_exp (evm-hack-registry mirror).
- AuditVault finding: 53581-first-submission-can-be-triggered-multiple-times-sigmaprime.
Alerts & third-party analyses
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