Reproduced Exploit
Automata DCAP: an expired CRL still releases a 5 token attestation bounty
Certificate verification loads a CRL and treats it as valid if ret.length > 0. It does not check expiry or that the CRL belongs to the current issuer certificate. The stored platform CRL expired at timestamp 0 and lists serials 1 and 2, not 0xDEAD. Intel's published revocation is 0xDEAD. verifyCert…
Loss
5 tokens paid to a caller whose platform certificate serial is 0xDEAD
Chain
Ethereum
Category
logic
Date
Feb 2025
Source
AuditVault
EVM Playground
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Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 53368-certificate-chain-verification-allows-expired-and-irrelevant. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 53368-certificate-chain-verification-allows-expired-and-irrelevant_exp in the
evm-hack-registrymirror.
Vulnerability classes:
vuln/logic/missing-validation·vuln/logic/missing-check
Key info#
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Loss | 5 tokens paid to a caller whose platform certificate serial is 0xDEAD |
| Vulnerable contract | PccsRouter._getPcsAttestationData |
| Attacker EOA | 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 |
| Attack contract | Exploit |
| Attack tx | Exploit.run() |
| Chain / block / date | Ethereum model · block 0 · 2025-02 |
| Compiler | solc 0.8.27, cancun, via IR |
| Bug class | A CRL is accepted whenever the byte string is nonempty |
TL;DR#
Certificate verification loads a CRL and treats it as valid if ret.length > 0. It does not check expiry or that the CRL belongs to the current issuer certificate. The stored platform CRL expired at timestamp 0 and lists serials 1 and 2, not 0xDEAD. Intel's published revocation is 0xDEAD. verifyCertChain still returns true, and the escrow pays its 5 token bounty. A router that reverts on an expired CRL leaves the 5 tokens in place.
Background#
Trail of Bits, February 2025, Automata DCAP attestation and on-chain PCCS. X509ChainBase.verifyCertChain pulls CRLs through PCCSRouter.getCrl. upsertPcsCertificates replaces a certificate and does not delete the old CRL.
The vulnerable code#
ret = pcsDao.getAttestedData(pcsDao.PCS_KEY(ca, crl));
// @> VULN: a CRL is accepted whenever the bytes are nonempty; expiry and issuer are never checked
valid = ret.length > 0;
The platform CRL is abi.encode(1, 2) with crlExpiry 0. block.timestamp is 1, so the list is already expired. Serial 0xDEAD is not in those bytes, so serialNumberIsRevoked is false and the chain returns true.
Root cause#
_getPcsAttestationData only checks that the stored bytes are nonempty. Expiry, issuer identity, and the current published revocation are ignored. Upserting a certificate does not replace the CRL.
Preconditions#
- A nonempty platform CRL is stored, expired, and does not contain serial 0xDEAD.
- The published revocation for that CA is 0xDEAD.
- An escrow pays its balance to any caller whose
verifyCertChainreturns true.
Attack walkthrough#
upsertPcsCertificateswrites a new platform certificate and leaves the old CRL.- The CRL expiry is 0, which is before this block's timestamp.
- Serial 0xDEAD is absent from the stored list.
verifyCertChainloads that CRL, sees nonempty bytes, and returns true.- The escrow transfers 5 tokens to the caller and ends empty.
- The fixed router reverts because the CRL is expired, so the bounty stays.
Diagrams#
Impact#
A revoked platform certificate is accepted. The caller collects the 5 token bounty that a current CRL would have blocked. Any later gate that trusts verifyCertChain grants the same privilege.
Remediation#
Reject a CRL whose expiry is before block.timestamp, and require the CRL's issuer to match the certificate currently stored for that CA. Include the published revocation serial before returning success.
How to reproduce#
cd 53368-certificate-chain-verification-allows-expired-and-irrelevant_exp
forge test -vv
test_exploit_expired_crl_pays_revoked_cert asserts verification succeeds and the caller holds 5 tokens. test_control_expired_crl_keeps_the_bounty expects the fixed claim to revert and the escrow to keep 5 tokens. Captured output is output.txt.
Sources#
- AuditVault finding: https://github.com/Auditware/AuditVault/blob/main/findings/53368-certificate-chain-verification-allows-expired-and-irrelevant.md
- Trail of Bits review: https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/2025-02-automata-dcap-attestation-onchain-pccs-securityreview.pdf
Sources & further analysis#
Reproductions & code
- Standalone PoC + full trace: 53368-certificate-chain-verification-allows-expired-and-irrelevant_exp (evm-hack-registry mirror).
- AuditVault finding: 53368-certificate-chain-verification-allows-expired-and-irrelevant.
Alerts & third-party analyses
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