Reproduced Exploit
OmoVault — a donation inflates topOff and Alice cannot redeem
Alice and Bob each have 20 in the vault, so _totalAssets is 40. The agent holds the 20 it is supposed to return for Bob's redeem. Bob transfers another 20 to the agent before topOff. The function pulls the agent's whole balance, pays Bob 40, and subtracts 40 from _totalAssets. Alice's later redeem…
Chain
Other
Category
logic
Date
Jan 2025
Source
AuditVault
EVM Playground
Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync
The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. Query opens a search over the trace: previous and next writes, balance changes and calls, breakpoints, and a diff of everything that changed between two steps. No backend, no live RPC.
Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 53314-c-03-users-cant-redeem-funds-due-to-malicious-manipulation-o. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 53314-c-03-users-cant-redeem-funds-due-to-malicious-manipulation-o_exp in the
evm-hack-registrymirror.
Vulnerability classes:
vuln/logic/state-update·vuln/dos/frozen-funds
Key info#
| Protocol | OmoVault |
| Finding | Pashov Audit Group C-03, AuditVault 53314 |
| Vulnerable code | OmoVault.topOff sweeps agentBalance |
| Harm | Bob is paid 40 and Alice's redeem of 20 reverts. The control pays Alice 20. |
| Chain | local synthetic |
TL;DR#
Alice and Bob each have 20 in the vault, so _totalAssets is 40. The agent holds the 20 it is supposed to return for Bob's redeem. Bob transfers another 20 to the agent before topOff. The function pulls the agent's whole balance, pays Bob 40, and subtracts 40 from _totalAssets. Alice's later redeem underflows. A vault that pulls record.assets instead still has 20 of accounting left, and Alice is paid 20.
The vulnerable code#
uint256 agentBalance = asset.balanceOf(msg.sender);
asset.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), agentBalance);
asset.transfer(record.receiver, agentBalance);
totalAssets -= agentBalance;
The report's fix pulls and forwards record.assets, not the agent's token balance.
Root cause#
topOff treats the agent's entire token balance as the amount owed to the redeem receiver. A direct transfer to the agent changes that balance without changing the recorded redeem amount, and the same number is subtracted from _totalAssets.
Preconditions#
The caller is agents(0), so the agent check passes. The recorded redeem is 20 to Bob. The agent already holds that 20. Bob donates 20 more. The vault contract still holds Alice's 20. _totalAssets starts at 40.
Attack walkthrough#
- Bob transfers 20 to the agent. The agent balance is 40.
- The agent calls
topOff. transferFrompulls 40 and_totalAssetsbecomes 0.- Bob's balance goes from 20 to 40. His profit in the attack call is 20.
- Alice's
redeem(20)reverts. The vault still holds her 20 tokens. - The control agent also holds a 20 donation plus 20 of assets. It pulls only
record.assets. Alice is then paid 20.
Diagrams#
Impact#
Bob receives 40 after donating 20, so he keeps 20 that was not his redeem. _totalAssets is 0 while the vault still holds Alice's 20, and her redeem reverts. The control leaves _totalAssets at 20 and pays her that 20.
Remediation#
Pull and forward record.assets, and subtract that amount from _totalAssets, as the report's diff shows.
How to reproduce#
cd 53314-c-03-users-cant-redeem-funds-due-to-malicious-manipulation-o_exp
forge test -vv
Sources#
- AuditVault finding: https://github.com/Auditware/AuditVault/blob/main/findings/53314-c-03-users-cant-redeem-funds-due-to-malicious-manipulation-o.md
- Pashov report: https://github.com/pashov/audits/blob/master/team/md/Omo-security-review_2025-01-25.md
- Reviewed tree: https://github.com/omo-protocol/omo-mvp/tree/c52b6d39ec34f640533c4fd30310e1fba31f5f39
Sources & further analysis#
Reproductions & code
- Standalone PoC + full trace: 53314-c-03-users-cant-redeem-funds-due-to-malicious-manipulation-o_exp (evm-hack-registry mirror).
- AuditVault finding: 53314-c-03-users-cant-redeem-funds-due-to-malicious-manipulation-o.
Alerts & third-party analyses
These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.