Reproduced Exploit
Nexus: LidoStrategy can stake ETH and cannot return it
DepositETH.executeStrategies delegatecalls whatever the executor passes, and the Lido strategy only implements stake. Staking 10 ETH mints 10 stETH to the vault. The redemption delegatecall to withdraw reverts CallFailed. The depositor's ETH balance stays 0. A strategy that implements withdraw unwr…
Loss
10 stETH stuck in DepositETH. The depositor gets 0 ETH back
Chain
Ethereum
Category
dos
Date
Nov 2024
Source
AuditVault
EVM Playground
Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync
The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. Query opens a search over the trace: previous and next writes, balance changes and calls, breakpoints, and a diff of everything that changed between two steps. No backend, no live RPC.
Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 44983-h-03-lack-of-withdrawal-functionality-in-strategy-contracts. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 44983-h-03-lack-of-withdrawal-functionality-in-strategy-contracts_exp in the
evm-hack-registrymirror.
Vulnerability classes:
vuln/dos/frozen-funds·vuln/logic/missing-check
Key info#
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Loss | 10 stETH stuck in DepositETH. The depositor gets 0 ETH back |
| Vulnerable contract | DepositETH.executeStrategies |
| Attacker EOA | 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 |
| Attack contract | Exploit |
| Attack tx | Exploit.run() |
| Chain / block / date | Ethereum model · block 0 · 2024-11 |
| Compiler | solc 0.8.27, cancun, via IR |
| Bug class | Strategy delegatecall with no withdraw |
TL;DR#
DepositETH.executeStrategies delegatecalls whatever the executor passes, and the Lido strategy only implements stake. Staking 10 ETH mints 10 stETH to the vault. The redemption delegatecall to withdraw reverts CallFailed. The depositor's ETH balance stays 0. A strategy that implements withdraw unwraps the stETH back into 10 ETH.
Background#
Pashov Audit Group's Nexus review of 29 November 2024, finding H-03. LidoStrategy and DSRStrategy take deposits and have no function that returns the asset plus yield. Share redemptions cannot be met.
The vulnerable code#
(bool success, bytes memory returndata) =
_executionData[i].strategy.delegatecall(_executionData[i].executionData); // @> VULN
if (!success) {
if (returndata.length == 0) revert CallFailed();
}
LidoStrategy.stake burns the vault's ETH token and mints stETH to the vault, because the delegatecall's address(this) is the vault. There is no withdraw.
The fix is a withdraw that burns stETH and mints the ETH token back, and a redeem path that delegatecalls it.
Root cause#
The only strategy code the vault can run moves assets out of the redeemable token. Nothing moves them back, and a failed delegatecall reverts instead of returning funds.
Preconditions#
strategyExecutoris the caller. The Lido strategy is registered.- The depositor has approved 10 ETH tokens. The strategy has
stakeand does not havewithdraw.
Attack walkthrough#
- Deposit pulls 10 ETH tokens into the vault and mints 10 shares.
stakeruns by delegatecall. The vault's ETH balance becomes 0 and its stETH balance becomes 10.- Redeem builds
withdraw(address,address,uint256)and delegatecalls it. - The strategy has no such function. Returndata is empty, so the vault reverts
CallFailed. - The low-level call is caught. stETH is still 10 and the depositor still has 0 ETH.
Diagrams#
Impact#
The depositor cannot redeem. 10 stETH is stuck on DepositETH and the ETH token balance of the depositor is 0. The control strategy's withdraw returns the 10 ETH token to the vault and burns the stETH.
How to reproduce#
cd 44983-h-03-lack-of-withdrawal-functionality-in-strategy-contracts_exp
forge test -vv
test_exploit_steth_stuck asserts the revert, a 10 stETH vault balance, and a 0 ETH depositor balance. test_control_fixed_strategy_returns_eth asserts the unwrap. Output is output.txt.
Sources#
- AuditVault finding: https://github.com/Auditware/AuditVault/blob/main/findings/44983-h-03-lack-of-withdrawal-functionality-in-strategy-contracts.md
- Report: https://github.com/pashov/audits/blob/master/team/md/Nexus-security-review_2024-11-29.md
Sources & further analysis#
Reproductions & code
- Standalone PoC + full trace: 44983-h-03-lack-of-withdrawal-functionality-in-strategy-contracts_exp (evm-hack-registry mirror).
- AuditVault finding: 44983-h-03-lack-of-withdrawal-functionality-in-strategy-contracts.
Alerts & third-party analyses
These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.