Reproduced Exploit
Prophet: ten addresses that never pledged drain a 1,000 BOND NoResolution pot
When a dispute status is NoResolution, claimEscalationReward sets _numberOfPledges to 1 and credits amountPerPledger to whatever address the caller passes. The address does not need a pledge for or against the request. Ten fresh contracts each take 100 BOND and forward it. The accounting contract i…
Loss
1,000 BOND. Each of 10 addresses receives one 100 BOND pledge without having pledged
Chain
Ethereum
Category
logic
Date
May 2024
Source
AuditVault
EVM Playground
Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync
The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. Query opens a search over the trace: previous and next writes, balance changes and calls, breakpoints, and a diff of everything that changed between two steps. No backend, no live RPC.
Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 41798-dispute-pledges-for-a-noresolution-dispute-can-be-stolen-by. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 41798-dispute-pledges-for-a-noresolution-dispute-can-be-stolen-by_exp in the
evm-hack-registrymirror.
Vulnerability classes:
vuln/logic/missing-check·vuln/access-control/missing-auth
Key info#
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Loss | 1,000 BOND. Each of 10 addresses receives one 100 BOND pledge without having pledged |
| Vulnerable contract | BondEscalationAccounting.claimEscalationReward |
| Attacker EOA | 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000a346 |
| Attack contract | Exploit |
| Attack tx | Exploit.run() |
| Chain / block / date | Ethereum model · block 0 · 2024-05 |
| Compiler | solc 0.8.27, cancun, via IR |
| Bug class | NoResolution hardcodes the pledge count to 1 for any address |
TL;DR#
When a dispute status is NoResolution, claimEscalationReward sets _numberOfPledges to 1 and credits amountPerPledger to whatever address the caller passes. The address does not need a pledge for or against the request. Ten fresh contracts each take 100 BOND and forward it. The accounting contract is left with 0. The control counts real pledges, both of which are 0, and pays nothing.
Background#
Trail of Bits' May 2024 review of Wonderland Prophet, by Tjaden Hess. BondEscalationAccounting lets pledgers withdraw after an escalated dispute resolves. The report's scenario is 1,000 tokens pledged and 100 per account. Eve creates 10 accounts and claims once for each.
The vulnerable code#
if (_status == IOracle.DisputeStatus.NoResolution) {
// @> VULN: NoResolution credits one pledge to any address, pledged or not
_numberOfPledges = 1;
} else {
_numberOfPledges = _status == IOracle.DisputeStatus.Won
? _result.bondEscalationModule.pledgesForDispute(_requestId, _pledger)
: _result.bondEscalationModule.pledgesAgainstDispute(_requestId, _pledger);
}
The credit and the pot update use that count:
uint256 _claimAmount = _amountPerPledger * _numberOfPledges;
balanceOf[_pledger][_token] += _claimAmount;
unchecked {
pledges[_disputeId][_token] -= _claimAmount;
}
Root cause#
The NoResolution branch ignores pledgesForDispute and pledgesAgainstDispute. Any unused address is treated as a pledger of exactly one unit. pledgerClaimed only stops the same address from claiming twice.
Preconditions#
- An escalation result exists.
amountPerPledgeris 100 BOND and the token is set, so the empty-result revert does not fire. - The oracle status for the dispute is
NoResolution. - The accounting contract holds 1,000 BOND and
pledges[dispute][token]is 1,000. - The caller is not a module or a real pledger.
Attack walkthrough#
- The pot is 1,000 BOND. Ten sock contracts have never pledged.
- Each sock calls
claimEscalationRewardwith itself as the pledger. - The status is NoResolution, so the pledge count is forced to 1 and 100 BOND is credited.
withdrawpays that credit and the sock forwards it to the attacker.- After ten calls the attacker holds 1,000 BOND and the pot is 0.
- The control adds
pledgesForDisputeandpledgesAgainstDispute. Both are 0, so the same call pays nothing and the pot stays 1,000.
Diagrams#
Impact#
Anyone can drain the pledge tokens for a NoResolution dispute. In this run the attacker receives the entire 1,000 BOND. Real pledgers are left with a claim against an empty balance. The control pays the attacker 0.
Remediation#
On NoResolution, set the pledge count from pledgesForDispute plus pledgesAgainstDispute for that address, which is the short-term fix in the Trail of Bits report. An address that never pledged then receives 0.
How to reproduce#
cd 41798-dispute-pledges-for-a-noresolution-dispute-can-be-stolen-by_exp
forge test -vv
test_exploit_ten_addresses_drain_1000_pledges asserts the attacker holds 1,000 BOND and the accounting balance is 0. test_control_zero_pledges_pay_nothing asserts a zero-pledge claim leaves the 1,000 BOND pot in place. Captured output is output.txt.
Sources#
- AuditVault finding: https://github.com/Auditware/AuditVault/blob/main/findings/41798-dispute-pledges-for-a-noresolution-dispute-can-be-stolen-by.md
- Trail of Bits review: https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/2024-05-wonderland-prophet-securityreview.pdf
Sources & further analysis#
Reproductions & code
- Standalone PoC + full trace: 41798-dispute-pledges-for-a-noresolution-dispute-can-be-stolen-by_exp (evm-hack-registry mirror).
- AuditVault finding: 41798-dispute-pledges-for-a-noresolution-dispute-can-be-stolen-by.
Alerts & third-party analyses
These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.