Reproduced Exploit
Prophet — a pledge can name its own bond token and still take the USDC dispute bond
pledgeAgainstDispute checks that the dispute argument matches the stored dispute, then decodes the bond token and the pledging deadline from a separate request argument. It never hashes that request and compares it to dispute.requestId.
Chain
Other
Category
input-validation
Date
May 2024
Source
AuditVault
EVM Playground
Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync
The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. Query opens a search over the trace: previous and next writes, balance changes and calls, breakpoints, and a diff of everything that changed between two steps. No backend, no live RPC.
Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 41793-arbitrary-request-data-can-be-provided-to-module-functions-i. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 41793-arbitrary-request-data-can-be-provided-to-module-functions-i_exp in the
evm-hack-registrymirror.
Vulnerability classes:
vuln/input-validation/missing·vuln/logic/missing-validation
Reproduction: a self-contained Foundry PoC that compiles and runs offline with only
forge-std— no fork and no RPC. Trace: output.txt. PoC: test/41793-arbitrary-request-data-can-be-provided-to-module-functions-i_exp.sol.
Key info#
| Impact | HIGH — 1 wei of an attacker token wins the dispute and takes the proposer's 1,000 USDC |
| Protocol | Wonderland Prophet, BondEscalationResolutionModule.pledge |
| Vulnerable code | deadline and bond token are read from the caller request, which is not compared to dispute.requestId |
| Bug class | Module validation trusts attacker-supplied request data |
| Finding | Trail of Bits — Wonderland Prophet, May 2024 · id 41793 |
| Report | Trail of Bits review |
| Source | AuditVault finding |
| Compiler | solc 0.8.27, cancun, via IR |
TL;DR#
pledgeAgainstDispute checks that the dispute argument matches the stored dispute, then decodes the bond token and the pledging deadline from a separate request argument. It never hashes that request and compares it to dispute.requestId.
The honest request's deadline has already passed. The attacker passes their own ERC-20 and a deadline that is still open, pledges 1 wei, and resolve pays them the 1,000 USDC that was bonded on the dispute. A fixed module reverts with request mismatch before any token moves.
The vulnerable code#
require(supplied.requestId == dispute.requestId, "dispute");
Request memory params = request;
uint256 deadline = ESCALATION_START + params.timeUntilDeadline; // @> VULN
ERC20(params.bondToken).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
activeToken = params.bondToken;
Request memory params = request;
+bytes32 got = keccak256(abi.encode(params));
+require(got == dispute.requestId, "request mismatch");
uint256 deadline = ESCALATION_START + params.timeUntilDeadline;
Attack walkthrough#
- The module holds 1,000 USDC posted for the honest pricing request. Escalation started at timestamp 1, so the real window is over.
- The attacker builds a request whose id does not match, whose bond token is EVIL, and whose
timeUntilDeadlineisblock.timestamp. pledgeAgainstDisputeaccepts it. The deadline check uses the fake window.transferFrompulls 1 wei of EVIL.activeTokenis now EVIL and the against-side leads.resolvesends the USDC pot to the caller.
Diagrams#
Impact#
Anyone can out-pledge a dispute with a token they minted and take the honest side's bond. Here that bond is 1,000 USDC, paid for 1 wei of EVIL. The same missing check is what the review flags on the other resolution modules.
Sources#
- AuditVault 41793
- Trail of Bits, Wonderland Prophet, May 2024
- Blamed function:
BondEscalationResolutionModule._pledge, as quoted in that review
Sources & further analysis#
Reproductions & code
- Standalone PoC + full trace: 41793-arbitrary-request-data-can-be-provided-to-module-functions-i_exp (evm-hack-registry mirror).
- AuditVault finding: 41793-arbitrary-request-data-can-be-provided-to-module-functions-i.
Alerts & third-party analyses
These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.