Reproduced Exploit
StationX: native deposits sit on the DAO and the execution call cannot move them
_buyGovernanceTokenERC20DAO sends msg.value to the DAO when depositTokenAddress is the native token. updateProposalAndExecution is the DAO's call-out, and it uses _contract.call(_data) with no value. A 1 ETH deposit stays on the DAO. The target observes msg.value == 0.
Loss
1 ETH sent to the DAO on a native governance-token purchase. The execution call forwards 0
Chain
Ethereum
Category
dos
Date
Jun 2024
Source
AuditVault
EVM Playground
Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync
The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. Query opens a search over the trace: previous and next writes, balance changes and calls, breakpoints, and a diff of everything that changed between two steps. No backend, no live RPC.
Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 41383-c-02-native-tokens-in-the-daos-are-stuck-pashov-audit-group. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 41383-c-02-native-tokens-in-the-daos-are-stuck-pashov-audit-group_exp in the
evm-hack-registrymirror.
Vulnerability classes:
vuln/dos/frozen-funds·vuln/logic/missing-check
Key info#
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Loss | 1 ETH sent to the DAO on a native governance-token purchase. The execution call forwards 0 |
| Vulnerable contract | ERC20DAO.updateProposalAndExecution |
| Attacker EOA | 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 |
| Attack contract | Exploit |
| Attack tx | Exploit.run() |
| Chain / block / date | Ethereum model · block 0 · 2024-06 |
| Compiler | solc 0.8.27, cancun, via IR |
| Bug class | Native custody with no value-bearing execution path |
TL;DR#
_buyGovernanceTokenERC20DAO sends msg.value to the DAO when depositTokenAddress is the native token. updateProposalAndExecution is the DAO's call-out, and it uses _contract.call(_data) with no value. A 1 ETH deposit stays on the DAO. The target observes msg.value == 0.
The vulnerable code#
payable(_daoDetails.assetsStoredOnGnosis ? _daoDetails.gnosisAddress : dao).call{value: _totalAmount}("");
(bool success,) = _contract.call(_data); // @> VULN: the call forwards no value, so native deposits on the DAO cannot be moved
The review's fix adds a _value argument and call{value: _value}, and makes the function payable so the DAO can attach value without spending its deposits.
Root cause#
Deposits arrive as ETH. The only outbound call cannot name an amount of ETH. There is no withdraw function either.
Preconditions#
- The DAO's deposit token is the native token address.
- A buyer sends 1 ETH through the factory buy path.
- A later execution targets a payable sink.
Attack walkthrough#
- The buyer calls the factory with 1 ETH.
- The native branch forwards that 1 ETH to the DAO.
- Execution calls the sink with empty value.
- The sink records 0. The DAO balance is still 1 ETH.
Diagrams#
Impact#
Every DAO that takes native deposits accumulates ETH it cannot spend, send, or return. This run leaves 1 ETH on the DAO. The same path applies to every later native purchase.
Remediation#
Pass _value into updateProposalAndExecution and forward it with call{value: _value}, as the Pashov diff specifies. Make the function payable if callers should attach fresh ETH instead of spending deposits.
How to reproduce#
cd 41383-c-02-native-tokens-in-the-daos-are-stuck-pashov-audit-group_exp
forge test -vv
Captured output is output.txt.
Sources#
-
AuditVault finding: https://github.com/Auditware/AuditVault/blob/main/findings/41383-c-02-native-tokens-in-the-daos-are-stuck-pashov-audit-group.md
-
Pashov StationX review: https://github.com/pashov/audits/blob/master/team/md/StationX-security-review.md
-
Report published from the June 2024 review. The finding file has no genome frontmatter. Severity in the report is Impact High, Likelihood High.
Sources & further analysis#
Reproductions & code
- Standalone PoC + full trace: 41383-c-02-native-tokens-in-the-daos-are-stuck-pashov-audit-group_exp (evm-hack-registry mirror).
- AuditVault finding: 41383-c-02-native-tokens-in-the-daos-are-stuck-pashov-audit-group.
Alerts & third-party analyses
These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.