Reproduced Exploit
Dumont: a spot MONT quote inflates player rewards
getMontPrice is quoteExactInputSingle on the current pool. transferPlayerRewards pays ((houseFee 1e18 8) / 10) / price. Selling 9000 MONT moves the spot quote from 1e6 to 1e4. A 10 USDT house fee then pays 800 MONT instead of 8. The player buys the MONT back. The spot quote is 1e6 again and the pla…
Loss
A 10 USDT house fee pays 800 MONT instead of 8
Chain
Other
Category
oracle
Date
Sep 2024
Source
AuditVault
EVM Playground
Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync
The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. Query opens a search over the trace: previous and next writes, balance changes and calls, breakpoints, and a diff of everything that changed between two steps. No backend, no live RPC.
Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 38016-h-02-mont-price-can-be-manipulated-to-earn-more-rewards-pash. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 38016-h-02-mont-price-can-be-manipulated-to-earn-more-rewards-pash_exp in the
evm-hack-registrymirror.
Vulnerability classes:
vuln/oracle/spot-price·vuln/logic/reward-calculation
Key info#
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Loss | A 10 USDT house fee pays 800 MONT instead of 8 |
| Vulnerable contract | MontRewardManager.transferPlayerRewards |
| Attacker EOA | 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 |
| Attack contract | Exploit |
| Attack tx | Exploit.run() |
| Chain / block / date | Local synthetic · 2024-09 |
| Compiler | solc 0.8.27, cancun, via IR |
| Bug class | Reward divides by a Uniswap spot quote |
TL;DR#
getMontPrice is quoteExactInputSingle on the current pool. transferPlayerRewards pays ((houseFee * 1e18 * 8) / 10) / price. Selling 9000 MONT moves the spot quote from 1e6 to 1e4. A 10 USDT house fee then pays 800 MONT instead of 8. The player buys the MONT back. The spot quote is 1e6 again and the player holds 9800 MONT.
The vulnerable code#
function transferPlayerRewards(address player, uint256 houseFee) external {
uint256 price = getMontPrice();
uint256 reward = ((houseFee * 1e18 * 8) / 10) / price;
mont.transfer(player, reward);
}
getMontPrice reads the pool's spot reserves. A TWAP or a fixed oracle is the report's recommendation.
Root cause#
The reward denominator is a same-block pool quote. The player can move that quote before the reward is paid and trade back after.
Preconditions#
- The pool quotes 1 MONT at 1e6 before the sale.
- The player can sell 9000 MONT into that pool and buy it back.
- A 10 USDT house fee is converted to MONT at the depressed quote.
Attack walkthrough#
- The spot quote is 1e6, so a fair reward on 10 USDT is 8 MONT.
- The player sells 9000 MONT and the quote falls to 1e4.
- The manager pays 800 MONT.
- The player buys the sold MONT back. The quote is 1e6 again and the player holds 9800 MONT.
Diagrams#
Impact#
Rewards denominated in MONT are inflated by the same trade that moves the quote. This run pays 800 MONT instead of 8 and leaves the player with 9800 MONT.
How to reproduce#
cd 38016-h-02-mont-price-can-be-manipulated-to-earn-more-rewards-pash_exp
forge test -vv
Sources#
- AuditVault finding: https://github.com/Auditware/AuditVault/blob/main/findings/38016-h-02-mont-price-can-be-manipulated-to-earn-more-rewards-pash.md
- Pashov review: https://github.com/pashov/audits/blob/master/team/md/Dumont-security-review.md
Sources & further analysis#
Reproductions & code
- Standalone PoC + full trace: 38016-h-02-mont-price-can-be-manipulated-to-earn-more-rewards-pash_exp (evm-hack-registry mirror).
- AuditVault finding: 38016-h-02-mont-price-can-be-manipulated-to-earn-more-rewards-pash.
Alerts & third-party analyses
These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.