Reproduced Exploit
Catalyst: an empty projectId lets the creator reprice IPSeed and drain its ETH
spawn rejects a token only after projectId is non-empty. The creator spawns with an empty project id and curve parameters of 0, mints 10 tokens for 0 ETH, then spawns the same tokenId again with a 1 ETH sell price. Selling those tokens pays out the 10 ETH IPSeed was holding for other buyers. The co…
Loss
10 tokens minted at price 0 are sold for the 10 ETH already held by IPSeed. IPSeed ends at 0
Chain
Ethereum
Category
logic
Date
Jun 2025
Source
AuditVault
EVM Playground
Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync
The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. Query opens a search over the trace: previous and next writes, balance changes and calls, breakpoints, and a diff of everything that changed between two steps. No backend, no live RPC.
Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 31585-c-01-attacker-can-drain-all-eth-from-ipseed-due-to-re-config. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 31585-c-01-attacker-can-drain-all-eth-from-ipseed-due-to-re-config_exp in the
evm-hack-registrymirror.
Vulnerability classes:
vuln/logic/incorrect-state-transition·vuln/access-control/missing-auth
Key info#
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Loss | 10 tokens minted at price 0 are sold for the 10 ETH already held by IPSeed. IPSeed ends at 0 |
| Vulnerable contract | IPSeed.spawn |
| Attacker EOA | 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 (the creator) |
| Attack contract | Exploit |
| Attack tx | Exploit.run() |
| Chain / block / date | Ethereum model · block 0 · 2025-06 |
| Compiler | solc 0.8.27, cancun |
| Bug class | TokenAlreadyExists only trips when projectId is non-empty |
TL;DR#
spawn rejects a token only after projectId is non-empty. The creator spawns with an empty project id and curve parameters of 0, mints 10 tokens for 0 ETH, then spawns the same tokenId again with a 1 ETH sell price. Selling those tokens pays out the 10 ETH IPSeed was holding for other buyers. The contract balance is 0.
The vulnerable code#
if (bytes(tokenMeta[tokenId].projectId).length > 0) { // @> VULN: an empty projectId never trips TokenAlreadyExists, so tokenId can be spawned again
revert TokenAlreadyExists();
}
- if (bytes(tokenMeta[tokenId].projectId).length > 0) revert TokenAlreadyExists();
+ require(bytes(projectId).length > 0, "empty project");
+ if (bytes(tokenMeta[tokenId].projectId).length > 0) revert TokenAlreadyExists();
Root cause#
The existence check reads the stored projectId, and the attack keeps that string empty. Curve parameters are part of the metadata write, so the second spawn changes the price of tokens that were minted for free.
Preconditions#
tokenIdiskeccak256(creator, ""), so both spawns use the same id.- Curve parameters of 0 make
getBuyPricereturn 0. - IPSeed already holds 10 ETH from other buyers.
- The second spawn sets curve parameters to 1 ETH per token.
Attack walkthrough#
- Spawn with an empty project id and zero parameters.
TokenAlreadyExistsdoes not fire.- Mint 10 tokens. The price check is
msg.value == 0. - Spawn the same id again with parameters of 1 ETH.
- Sell 10 tokens.
getSellPricepays 10 ETH. - The creator holds 10 ETH. IPSeed holds 0.
Diagrams#
Impact#
Buyers who funded IPSeed lose the 10 ETH. The creator paid nothing for the tokens that were sold. Requiring a non-empty projectId on the first spawn makes the second call hit TokenAlreadyExists.
How to reproduce#
cd 31585-c-01-attacker-can-drain-all-eth-from-ipseed-due-to-re-config_exp
forge test -vv
Sources#
- AuditVault finding: https://github.com/Auditware/AuditVault/blob/main/findings/31585-c-01-attacker-can-drain-all-eth-from-ipseed-due-to-re-config.md
- Pashov Catalyst review: https://github.com/pashov/audits/blob/master/team/md/Catalyst-security-review.md
- Reviewed tree: https://github.com/moleculeprotocol/desci-ecosystem/tree/e7980268004251020b47ba450c3c684dc0f38247
Sources & further analysis#
Reproductions & code
- Standalone PoC + full trace: 31585-c-01-attacker-can-drain-all-eth-from-ipseed-due-to-re-config_exp (evm-hack-registry mirror).
- AuditVault finding: 31585-c-01-attacker-can-drain-all-eth-from-ipseed-due-to-re-config.
Alerts & third-party analyses
These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.