Reproduced Exploit
Recall — [H-06] Reentrancy in leave() leads to halting of bottom-up checkpoints
Reentrancy via genesis ETH refund + unguarded stake() bootstraps mid-leave; confirmDeposit reverts forever
Chain
Other
Category
untagged
Date
Feb 2025
Source
AuditVault
EVM Playground
Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync
The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. No backend, no live RPC.
Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 65093-h-06-reentrancy-in-function. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 65093-h-06-reentrancy-in-function_exp in the
evm-hack-registrymirror.
Vulnerability classes: severity/high · platform/code4rena · sector/staking · sector/governance
Reproduction: self-contained Foundry PoC with only
forge-std— no fork, no RPC. Full trace: output.txt.
AuditVault taxonomy: lang/solidity · platform/code4rena · has/poc · severity/high · protocol Recall
Key info#
| Impact | HIGH — Reentrancy via genesis ETH refund + unguarded stake() bootstraps mid-leave; confirmDeposit reverts forever |
| Protocol | Recall (IPC / subnet actor) |
| Finding | Code4rena 2025-02-recall · #65093 |
| Report | 2025-02-recall |
| Source | AuditVault |
| Compiler | ^0.8.24 (PoC) |
TL;DR#
Reentrancy via genesis ETH refund + unguarded stake() bootstraps mid-leave; confirmDeposit reverts forever
The vulnerable code#
(bool success, ) = payable(msg.sender).call{value: genesisBal}(""); // @> VULN
Fix: CEI; nonReentrant on stake/join; re-check !bootstrapped after external calls.
Root cause#
See vulnerable line above. Reduced synthetic preserves the blamed statement verbatim (@> VULN).
Preconditions#
- Audited Recall / IPC contracts at contest commit
ab5f90b9. - Attack path as described in the Code4rena report.
Attack walkthrough#
- Deploy the synthetic vulnerable surface.
- Execute the attack in
Exploit.run(). - Assert the report's concrete harm (funds / liveness / forged consensus).
Diagrams#
Remediation#
CEI; nonReentrant on stake/join; re-check !bootstrapped after external calls.
Sources#
- AuditVault finding
- Code4rena report 2025-02-recall
- Reduced source: code-423n4/2025-02-recall@ab5f90b9
Sources & further analysis#
Reproductions & code
- Standalone PoC + full trace: 65093-h-06-reentrancy-in-function_exp (evm-hack-registry mirror).
- AuditVault finding: 65093-h-06-reentrancy-in-function.
Alerts & third-party analyses
These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.