Reproduced Exploit

GTE — Distributor addRewards with fake quoteToken drains real rewards

1. addRewards(launch, fake, 0, amount) accepts any token1. 2. Fake transferFrom succeeds; pendingQuoteRewards inflates. 3. Claims pay the registered real quote token. 4. HARM: attacker with stake drains real USDC rewards.

Aug 2025Otheruntagged2 min read

Chain

Other

Category

untagged

Date

Aug 2025

Source

AuditVault

EVM Playground

Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync

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The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. No backend, no live RPC.

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Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 64854-h-06-donations-to-distributor-with-arbitrary-quotetoken-can. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 64854-h-06-donations-to-distributor-with-arbitrary-quotetoken-can_exp in the evm-hack-registry mirror.


Vulnerability classes: missing-validation · direct-drain · reward-theft

Reproduction: self-contained Foundry PoC with only forge-std. Full trace: output.txt. PoC: test/64854-h-06-donations-to-distributor-with-arbitrary-quotetoken-can_exp.sol.

AuditVault taxonomy: lang/solidity · platform/code4rena · has/github · has/poc · severity/high · sector/dex · sector/launchpad · genome: direct-drain · reward-theft · reward-accounting


Key info#

ImpactHIGH — inflate quote rewards with fake token; claim real quote
ProtocolGTE
Vulnerable codeDistributor.addRewards
Bug classMissing quoteAsset validation
FindingCode4rena 2025-08 GTE · #64854 · H-06 · newspacexyz
ReportCode4rena report
SourceAuditVault
Compiler^0.8.24 (PoC)

TL;DR#

  1. addRewards(launch, fake, 0, amount) accepts any token1.
  2. Fake transferFrom succeeds; pendingQuoteRewards inflates.
  3. Claims pay the registered real quote token.
  4. HARM: attacker with stake drains real USDC rewards.

The vulnerable code#

SOLIDITY
if (quoteAssetAmount > 0) {
    rs.addQuoteRewards(launchAsset, quoteAsset, quoteAssetAmount); // @> VULN: quoteAsset unvalidated
    quoteAsset.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), uint256(quoteAssetAmount));
}

Fix: require provided quote equals the pool's registered quoteAsset.


Root cause#

Accounting updates use the caller-supplied quote address; payouts use storage rs.quoteAsset.


Preconditions#

  • Existing reward pool with stakers and real quote inventory.
  • Attacker holds some shares.

Attack walkthrough#

  1. Stake a small share.
  2. addRewards with malicious token1 and large amount1.
  3. claimRewards → receive real quote.

Diagrams#

flowchart TD A["addRewards launch + fake quote"] --> B["pendingQuoteRewards inflated"] B --> C["claimRewards"] C --> D["Real quote paid out"]

Impact#

Theft of distributor quote balances; can brick further claims for honest stakers.


Sources#


Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

Alerts & third-party analyses

  • Web3Sec X hacked database: search.
  • Rekt leaderboard: search.
  • Solodit incident search: search.

These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.