Remora: resolveUser migrates a departing investor's pending dividend into DividendManager._resolve

Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 63778-pending-payouts-when-resolving-an-investor-are-lost-because. The historical source/toolchain is unavailable; this entry is documentation only and claims no executable Forge PoC.

Vulnerability classes: vuln/locked-funds · vuln/reward-accounting

Reproduction: a faithful minimal reproduction of the vulnerable finding — the vulnerable function is reproduced verbatim (marked @>) with faithful minimal doubles; local deploy, no fork.

Root cause#

resolveUser migrates a departing investor's pending dividend into DividendManager._resolvedPay[newAddress], which no function ever reads, so P=1,000 USDC (1000000000 units) stays permanently locked in the manager and the new address can never claim it; a second resolve to the same address also overwrites and destroys the prior amount.

SOLIDITY


    // ── VERBATIM vulnerable function from the finding ──────────────────────────
    function _resolvePay(address oldAddress, address newAddress) internal {
        _getHolderManagementStorage()._resolvedPay[newAddress] = SafeCast.toUint128(_claimPayout(oldAddress)); // @> migrates payout into _resolvedPay[newAddress], but NO function ever reads it -> funds locked; also overwrites any prior value
        emit PaymentResolved(oldAddress, newAddress);
    }

Why it's exploitable here#

Attack path#

flowchart TD S0["Token symbol storage"] S1["Holder-management storage accessor"] S2["Clear the holder's pending dividend"] S3["Migrate payout to new address"] S4["Write into a mapping nothing reads"] H["resolveUser migrates a departing investor's pending dividend into Divi"] S0 --> S1 S1 --> S2 S2 --> S3 S3 --> S4 S4 --> H

Marked-line walkthrough (Playground)#

The EVM Playground pins each step to the exact executed source line in 0x671d353a77…:

L48 — Token symbol storage: Setup: token metadata field, part of the same security-token contract state layout.
L107 — Holder-management storage accessor: Setup: returns the storage struct holding each investor's pending dividends and the _resolvedPay mapping written on resolve.
L116 — Clear the holder's pending dividend: _claimPayout zeroes the old holder's pending balance and returns it — this returned amount is what resolve then misfiles.
L121 — Migrate payout to new address: _resolvePay moves a departing investor's pending dividend from oldAddress to their newAddress during a resolve.
L122 — Write into a mapping nothing reads: Root cause: the migrated payout is stored in _resolvedPay[newAddress], which no claim function ever reads, so the 1,000 USDC is permanently locked.
L149 — Read-only view of resolved pay: resolvedPayOf merely views _resolvedPay; there is no matching function to withdraw it, confirming the funds have no exit.
L161 — Emit payment-resolved event: Setup: emits PaymentResolved on the migration; the event fires even though the moved dividend is now unclaimable.

PoC#

Registry (Foundry, local deploy — verbatim vulnerable source + harm-asserting test + negative control):

BASH

cd 63778-pending-payouts-when-resolving-an-investor-are-lost-because_exp
forge test -vvv

The browser Playground replays the same synthetic opcode-for-opcode and measures the harm: resolveUser migrates a departing investor's pending dividend into DividendManager._resolvedPay[newAddress], which no function ever reads, so. Both gates are green (registry forge test PASS + Playground _verify-poc VERDICT: PASS).

Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

No executable Forge reproduction is claimed; the historical source/toolchain was unavailable for this finding.
AuditVault finding: 63778-pending-payouts-when-resolving-an-investor-are-lost-because.
Upstream DeFiHackLabs PoC directory: src/test.

Alerts & third-party analyses

DeFiHackLabs incident explorer: search "Remora: resolveUser migrates a departing investor's pending dividend into DividendManager._resolve".
Web3Sec X hacked database: search.
Rekt leaderboard: search.
Solodit incident search: search.

These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.

Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync