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Reproduced Exploit

Elytra: Missing 1e18 scale collapses tempElyAssetPrice to 2 (far below the 18-decimal oldElyAssetP

Jan 1970•Other•untagged•3 min read

Chain

Other

Category

untagged

Date

Jan 1970

Source

AuditVault

PoC & write-upPoC for your local evm-hack-analyzerAuditVault PoCs

EVM Playground

Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync

evm-hack-analyzer

The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. No backend, no live RPC.

Loading fork state…

Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 63546-h-03-scaling-error-in-elyasset-price-calculation-leads-to-fe. The historical source/toolchain is unavailable; this entry is documentation only and claims no executable Forge PoC.

Vulnerability classes: vuln/locked-funds · vuln/reward-accounting · vuln/price

Reproduction: a faithful minimal reproduction of the vulnerable finding — the vulnerable function is reproduced verbatim (marked @>) with faithful minimal doubles; local deploy, no fork.

Root cause#

Missing 1e18 scale collapses tempElyAssetPrice to 2 (far below the 18-decimal oldElyAssetPrice 1e18), so the reward/fee branch never fires and the protocol permanently accrues 0 performance fee instead of the owed 100e18 per update.

SOLIDITY
    function updateElyAssetPrice(uint256 totalValueInProtocol, uint256 elyAssetSupply) external {
        uint256 protocolFeeInHYPE;
        {
            uint256 tempElyAssetPrice = totalValueInProtocol / elyAssetSupply; // @> missing 1e18 scale: 18-dec/18-dec collapses price to a bare integer, always < oldElyAssetPrice
            if (tempElyAssetPrice > oldElyAssetPrice) {
                uint256 increaseInElyAssetPrice = tempElyAssetPrice - oldElyAssetPrice;

Why it's exploitable here#

Missing 1e18 scale collapses tempElyAssetPrice to 2 (far below the 18-decimal oldElyAssetPrice 1e18), so the reward/fee branch never fires and the protocol permanently accrues 0 performance fee instead of the owed 100e18 per update.

Attack path#

flowchart TD S0["Deploy vulnerable + fixed oracles"] S1["Wire the vulnerable oracle"] S2["Enter updateElyAssetPrice()"] S3["Missing 1e18 scale collapses price"] S4["Read back accrued fee — zero"] H["Missing 1e18 scale collapses tempElyAssetPrice to 2 (far below the 18-"] S0 --> S1 S1 --> S2 S2 --> S3 S3 --> S4 S4 --> H

Marked-line walkthrough (Playground)#

The EVM Playground pins each step to the exact executed source line in 0x671d353a77…:

  1. L130 — Deploy vulnerable + fixed oracles: Setup: deploy the buggy ElytraOracleV1 alongside an identical fixed control, both with the same 18-decimal price state.
  2. L132 — Wire the vulnerable oracle: Setup: record the vulnerable oracle's address so the exploit can drive its price update directly.
  3. L58 — Enter updateElyAssetPrice(): Call the update with realistic 18-decimal inputs (totalValue 2000e18, supply 1000e18), a true price of 2.0.
  4. L62 — Missing 1e18 scale collapses price: Root-cause: totalValueInProtocol / elyAssetSupply omits the 1e18 scale, so the price is bare integer 2 instead of 2e18.
  5. L139 — Read back accrued fee — zero: Because 2 < the 18-decimal oldElyAssetPrice of 1e18, the reward/fee branch never fires and the accrued fee stays 0.
  6. L141 — Fixed path accrues the owed fee: The scaled fixed oracle on identical inputs computes price 2e18 and accrues the 100e18 performance fee the protocol is owed.

PoC#

Registry (Foundry, local deploy — verbatim vulnerable source + harm-asserting test + negative control):

BASH
cd 63546-h-03-scaling-error-in-elyasset-price-calculation-leads-to-fe_exp
forge test -vvv

The browser Playground replays the same synthetic opcode-for-opcode and measures the harm: Missing 1e18 scale collapses tempElyAssetPrice to 2 (far below the 18-decimal oldElyAssetPrice 1e18), so the reward/fee branch never fires a. Both gates are green (registry forge test PASS + Playground _verify-poc VERDICT: PASS).

Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

Alerts & third-party analyses

These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.