Reproduced Exploit

Accountable: An async-pending cancel leaves its redeem request queued with shares intact while pendingC

Jan 1970Otheruntagged3 min read

Chain

Other

Category

untagged

Date

Jan 1970

Source

AuditVault

EVM Playground

Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync

evm-hack-analyzer

The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. No backend, no live RPC.

Loading fork state…

Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 62970-critical-dos-in-queue-processing-if-async-cancellations-are. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 62970-critical-dos-in-queue-processing-if-async-cancellations-are_exp in the evm-hack-registry mirror.


Vulnerability classes: vuln/locked-funds

Reproduction: a faithful minimal reproduction of the vulnerable finding — the vulnerable function is reproduced verbatim (marked @>) with faithful minimal doubles; local deploy, no fork.

Root cause#

An async-pending cancel leaves its redeem request queued with shares intact while pendingCancelRedeemRequest=true, so processUpToShares() permanently reverts on the _fulfillRedeemRequest cancel guard and every queued share (150 shares here: A's 50 stuck at the head + B's 100 behind it) is frozen and unclaimable.

SOLIDITY
        if (state.pendingRedeemRequest == 0) revert NoPendingRedeemRequest();
        if (state.pendingCancelRedeemRequest) revert CancelRedeemRequestPending();

        state.pendingCancelRedeemRequest = true;

        bool canCancel = strategy.onCancelRedeemRequest(address(this), controller); // @> async strategy returns false: flag set true but the queued shares are left UN-REDUCED

Why it's exploitable here#

An async-pending cancel leaves its redeem request queued with shares intact while pendingCancelRedeemRequest=true, so processUpToShares() permanently reverts on the _fulfillRedeemRequest cancel guard and every queued share (150 shares here: A's 50 stuck at the head + B's 100 behind it) is frozen and unclaimable.

Attack path#

flowchart TD S0["Per-controller vault state map"] S1["Read pending-cancel flag"] S2["Cancel a queued redeem"] S3["Flag set, request left queued"] S4["Fulfill reverts on cancel guard"] H["An async-pending cancel leaves its redeem request queued with shares i"] S0 --> S1 S1 --> S2 S2 --> S3 S3 --> S4 S4 --> H

Marked-line walkthrough (Playground)#

The EVM Playground pins each step to the exact executed source line in 0x671d353a77…:

  1. L105 — Per-controller vault state map: Setup: maps each controller to its VaultState holding redeem and cancel flags.
  2. L127 — Read pending-cancel flag: Returns whether a controller has an async cancel pending — the flag that later blocks queue processing.
  3. L146 — Cancel a queued redeem: cancelRedeemRequest marks a controller's queued redeem for async cancellation.
  4. L152 — Flag set, request left queued: Root cause: sets pendingCancelRedeemRequest=true but leaves the request in the FIFO with shares intact, so processing later trips its own cancel guard.
  5. L167 — Fulfill reverts on cancel guard: _fulfillRedeemRequest reverts when it hits a request flagged pending-cancel — the guard that permanently jams processUpToShares.
  6. L191 — Read next queued request: _processRequest pulls the head request's controller, shares, and price as the queue is walked.
  7. L228 — Vault-state struct definition: Setup: declares the VaultState struct, including the pending-cancel flag.

PoC#

Registry (Foundry, local deploy — verbatim vulnerable source + harm-asserting test + negative control):

BASH
cd 62970-critical-dos-in-queue-processing-if-async-cancellations-are_exp
forge test -vvv

The browser Playground replays the same synthetic opcode-for-opcode and measures the harm: An async-pending cancel leaves its redeem request queued with shares intact while pendingCancelRedeemRequest=true, so processUpToShares() pe. Both gates are green (registry forge test PASS + Playground _verify-poc VERDICT: PASS).


Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

Alerts & third-party analyses

These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.