Reproduced Exploit

CAP Labs — inconsistent vault balance tracking bricks borrowing

An untracked donation supplies physical tokens for burn, but the burn still decrements totalSupplies. The accounting invariant falls below totalBorrows and subsequent borrowing is disabled.

May 2025Otherlogic3 min read

Chain

Other

Category

logic

Date

May 2025

Source

AuditVault

EVM Playground

Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync

evm-hack-analyzer

The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. No backend, no live RPC.

Loading fork state…

Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 61528-inconsistent-balance-tracking-in-vault-creates-dos-for-asset. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 61528-inconsistent-balance-tracking-vault-dos_exp in the evm-hack-registry mirror.


Vulnerability classes: vuln/logic/state-update · vuln/dos/frozen-funds · vuln/input-validation/missing

Reproduction: Fully local synthetic; run forge test and inspect output.txt. The Playground bundle replays the same 61528-inconsistent-balance-tracking-vault-dos invariant.

Key info#

FieldValue
LossBorrowing capacity for the asset is denied (DoS); synthetic invariant reaches available=0
Vulnerable contractVaultLogic (reconstructed)
Attacker EOA0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 (synthetic caller)
Attack contractExploit
Attack txLocal Exploit.run() call (no historical transaction)
Chain · block · dateEthereum · local stub 0x1181d03 · 2025-05
CompilerSolidity 0.8.35 (pragma ^0.8.24)
Bug classvuln/logic/state-update · vuln/dos/frozen-funds · vuln/input-validation/missing

TL;DR#

An untracked donation supplies physical tokens for burn, but the burn still decrements totalSupplies. The accounting invariant falls below totalBorrows and subsequent borrowing is disabled.

Background#

AuditVault finding 61528-inconsistent-balance-tracking-vault-dos is an audit-time issue rather than a historical exploit. This write-up reduces the report to one state transition and keeps the claimed harm assertion executable offline.

The vulnerable code#

The minimized source is explicitly marked RECONSTRUCTED and preserves the report's blamed operation with an @> VULN marker in test/61528-inconsistent-balance-tracking-vault-dos.sol. It is byte-identical to the Playground synthetic source. No verified production source was available in this local checkout.

Root cause#

burn trusts the transferable balance instead of checking totalSupplies - totalBorrows before decrementing accounting.

Preconditions#

The affected protocol path is deployed; the attacker can reach the public operation described in the report. The synthetic removes unrelated integrations while preserving the state and authorization assumptions required for the finding.

Attack walkthrough#

  1. seed(100,90) → donate(5) → burn(15); totalSupplies=85, totalBorrows=90, maxBorrowable=0.
  2. The run() method requires the broken invariant and sets confirmed; the Forge trace records a passing test at output.txt:355.
  3. The remediation is to validate the accounting/state transition before accepting the external call or to consume the one-time state.

Diagrams#

flowchart TD A["Attacker invokes public path"] --> B["Vulnerable state transition"] B --> C["Inconsistent accounting or revert"] C --> D["Reported protocol harm"]

Remediation#

Validate external addresses and returned balances before updating state, and make each one-time transition explicit. Add invariant tests covering zero/deflationary/epoch-boundary inputs.

How to reproduce#

BASH
cd 61528-inconsistent-balance-tracking-vault-dos_exp
forge test -vvv

The browser replay uses scripts/poc-configs/61528-inconsistent-balance-tracking-vault-dos.mjs and the same local-deploy Exploit contract.

Sources#


Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

Alerts & third-party analyses

  • Web3Sec X hacked database: search.
  • Rekt leaderboard: search.
  • Solodit incident search: search.

These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.