Reproduced Exploit

Onemind FeePayer: ignored call success sticks the mint fee

Oct 2022•Other•dependency•1 min read

Chain

Other

Category

dependency

Date

Oct 2022

Source

AuditVault

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Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 57634-eth-can-get-stuck-on-the-contract-zokyo-none-onemind-markdow. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 57634-eth-can-get-stuck-on-the-contract-zokyo-none-onemind-markdow_exp in the evm-hack-registry mirror.


Vulnerability classes: vuln/dependency/unchecked-return-value

Reproduction: faithful local reproduction of AuditVault 57634. handleMintFee forwards ETH with call and does not require the success flag.

Root cause#

FeePayer.handleMintFee sends msg.value to the fee receiver and ignores the boolean returned by call. A reverting receiver does not revert the mint, and the ETH remains on FeePayer.

SOLIDITY
// @> VULN: call() success is ignored, so a failed ETH transfer does not revert
(bool ok,) = address(feeReceiver).call{value: msg.value}("");
mintCount += 1;

Attack path#

flowchart TD A["Caller sends 1 ETH to handleMintFee"] --> B["Fee receiver reverts inside call"] B --> C["Success flag is ignored"] C --> D["mintCount still increments"] D --> E["1 ETH remains on FeePayer"]

Impact#

The mint completes and 1 ETH is stuck in FeePayer. The receiver's balance stays 0. The fixed function requires ok, so the same call reverts and no ETH remains on the contract.

PoC#

BASH
cd 57634-eth-can-get-stuck-on-the-contract-zokyo-none-onemind-markdow_exp
forge test -vv

Sources#


Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

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