Reproduced Exploit

Rubicon — DOS of market operations with malicious offers

offer() accepts owner/recipient=0; OZ ERC20 reverts on transfer to zero, DoSing market fills.

Apr 2023Otheruntagged2 min read

Chain

Other

Category

untagged

Date

Apr 2023

Source

AuditVault

EVM Playground

Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync

evm-hack-analyzer

The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. No backend, no live RPC.

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Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 48951-h-12-dos-of-market-operations-with-malicious-offers-code4ren. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 48951-h-12-dos-of-market-operations-with-malicious-offers-code4ren_exp in the evm-hack-registry mirror.


Vulnerability classes: frozen-funds · permanent · dos-resistance

Reproduction: self-contained Foundry PoC with only forge-std — no fork, no RPC. Full trace: output.txt. PoC: test/48951-h-12-dos-of-market-operations-with-malicious-offers-code4ren_exp.sol.


Key info#

ImpactHIGH — Best-priced offer with recipient=address(0) bricks buyAllAmount/sellAllAmount (and Position)
ProtocolRubicon
Bug classfrozen-funds · permanent · dos-resistance
FindingCode4rena 2023-04-rubicon · #48951 · H-12 · reporter popular00
Reportcode4rena.com/reports/2023-04-rubicon
SourceAuditVault
StatusConfirmed. Reproduced as a standalone local synthetic.
Compiler^0.8.24 (PoC)

TL;DR#

offer() accepts owner/recipient=0; OZ ERC20 reverts on transfer to zero, DoSing market fills.


The vulnerable code#

See synthetic test/48951-h-12-dos-of-market-operations-with-malicious-offers-code4ren.sol (@> VULN markers).

Fix: Disallow zero owner/recipient; skip unfillable offers in fill loops.


Root cause#

offer() accepts owner/recipient=0; OZ ERC20 reverts on transfer to zero, DoSing market fills.


Preconditions#

Protocol deployed with the vulnerable code paths from the Code4rena contest.


Attack walkthrough#

See PoC run() and output.txt.


Diagrams#

sequenceDiagram participant User participant Protocol User->>Protocol: trigger vulnerable path Protocol->>Protocol: hit @> VULN line Protocol-->>User: harm realized

Impact#

Best-priced offer with recipient=address(0) bricks buyAllAmount/sellAllAmount (and Position)


Taxonomy#

  • genome: frozen-funds · permanent · dos-resistance
  • severity/high · platform/code4rena

Sources#


Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

Alerts & third-party analyses

  • Web3Sec X hacked database: search.
  • Rekt leaderboard: search.
  • Solodit incident search: search.

These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.