540 seconds is used instead of 540 days — AuditVault synthetic reduction

Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 43733-h-2-fluidlocker-getunlockingpercentage-uses-540-instead-of-5. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 43733-h-2-fluidlocker-getunlockingpercentage-uses-540-instead-of-5_exp in the evm-hack-registry mirror.

Vulnerability classes: vuln/arithmetic/underflow · vuln/input-validation/boundary

Reproduction: self-contained Foundry PoC with an offline synthetic contract. Full trace: output.txt.

AuditVault finding: 43733 · H-2: FluidLocker::_getUnlockingPercentage()uses 540 instead of540 daysleading to stuck funds as the unlocking percentage will be bigger than100% and underflow

Key info#

TL;DR#

The report discusses a bug found in the Superfluid locking contract, where the function _getUnlockingPercentage() incorrectly uses the number 540 instead of 540 days, leading to a large error and potential underflow. This can result in users being unable to unlock their funds or being forced to take a penalty. The root cause is identified as using 540 instead of 540 days in line 388 of the contract. The impact is that users may have their funds stuck or be forced to take a penalty. A fix for this issue has been included in a pull request by the protocol team.

Background#

The upstream report is a Solidity finding. This page keeps the vulnerable statement and demonstrates its security consequence in a small, deterministic EVM model; no live RPC or external dependencies are required.

The vulnerable code#

// The exact vulnerable pattern is retained in test/43733-h-2-fluidlocker-getunlockingpercentage-uses-540-instead-of-5.sol.
// @> see the marked statement in the synthetic reduction

Root cause#

The caller-controlled input or stale state is trusted before the required uniqueness, bounds, authorization, accounting, or reentrancy invariant is enforced. The marked line in the synthetic contract intentionally preserves that ordering so the assertion is executable.

Preconditions#

• The vulnerable contract is deployed with the state described by the report.
• The attacker can reach the affected entry point (or submit the report's crafted input).

Attack walkthrough#

1. Exploit.run() initializes the minimal state from the report.
2. The marked vulnerable operation executes without its required check.
3. The contract records the resulting invariant violation and emits a Proof event.
4. The test asserts the harm; the passing trace is recorded at output.txt:4.

Diagrams#

Remediation#

Apply the invariant before mutating state: accrue interest before adding principal; reject duplicate signers; use checked casts and bounded lengths; validate token/target/DAO identities; use nonReentrant; enforce slippage and fee equality; and validate the canonical authority or ownership relationship described by the report.

How to reproduce#

cd evm-hack-registry/43733-h-2-fluidlocker-getunlockingpercentage-uses-540-instead-of-5_exp
forge test -vvvvv

The test is offline and uses only the shared forge-std library. The corresponding Playground bundle is generated from scripts/poc-configs/43733-h-2-fluidlocker-getunlockingpercentage-uses-540-instead-of-5.mjs.

Sources#

• AuditVault finding
• https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-11-superfluid-locking-contract-judging
• Synthetic test

Reference: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-11-superfluid-locking-contract-judging

Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

• Standalone PoC + full trace: 43733-h-2-fluidlocker-getunlockingpercentage-uses-540-instead-of-5_exp (evm-hack-registry mirror).
• AuditVault finding: 43733-h-2-fluidlocker-getunlockingpercentage-uses-540-instead-of-5.

Alerts & third-party analyses

• Web3Sec X hacked database: search.
• Rekt leaderboard: search.
• Solodit incident search: search.

These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.