Reproduced Exploit

Streaming — arbitraryCall lets compromised gov drain user allowances

After an incentive is claimed, incentives[token]==0 so compromised governance can arbitraryCall the token with transferFrom and steal leftover allowances

Nov 2021Otheraccess-control2 min read

Chain

Other

Category

access-control

Date

Nov 2021

Source

AuditVault

EVM Playground

Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync

evm-hack-analyzer

The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. No backend, no live RPC.

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Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 42395-h-04-improper-implementation-of-arbitrarycall-allows-protoco. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 42395-h-04-improper-implementation-of-arbitrarycall-allows-protoco_exp in the evm-hack-registry mirror.


Vulnerability classes: vuln/access-control/dangerous-call · vuln/approval/leftover-allowance

Reproduction: a self-contained Foundry PoC that compiles & runs in an isolated project with only forge-std — no fork, no RPC, no anvil_state. Full trace: output.txt. PoC: test/42395-h-04-improper-implementation-of-arbitrarycall-allows-protoco_exp.sol.

AuditVault taxonomy: lang/solidity · sector/governance · platform/code4rena · severity/high · genome: missing-modifier · direct-drain · access-roles


Key info#

ImpactHIGH — After an incentive is claimed, incentives[token]==0 so compromised governance can arbitraryCall the token with transferFrom and steal leftover allowances
ProtocolStreaming Protocol
FindingCode4rena — Streaming Protocol, 2021-11 · #42395
Report2021-11-streaming
SourceAuditVault
StatusAudit finding — reproduced as a standalone local synthetic PoC.
Compiler^0.8.24 (PoC)

TL;DR#

After an incentive is claimed, incentives[token]==0 so compromised governance can arbitraryCall the token with transferFrom and steal leftover allowances

See the vulnerable line marked // @> VULN in test/42395-h-04-improper-implementation-of-arbitrarycall-allows-protoco.sol and the end-to-end Exploit.run() that asserts the harm.


Diagrams#

flowchart TD A[Setup vulnerable state] --> B[Attacker triggers vulnerable path] B --> C["Vulnerable line executes @> VULN"] C --> D[Harm asserted in run]

Impact#

After an incentive is claimed, incentives[token]==0 so compromised governance can arbitraryCall the token with transferFrom and steal leftover allowances


Sources#


Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

Alerts & third-party analyses

  • Web3Sec X hacked database: search.
  • Rekt leaderboard: search.
  • Solodit incident search: search.

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