Reproduced Exploit

Maia DAO — checkParams does not check token is underlying of hToken

1. checkParams requires underlying exists and hToken is local, not that they pair.\n2. Attacker deposits USDC with hToken=hEther.\n3. Root mints 10 global hEther for 10 USDC.

May 2023Otheruntagged2 min read

Chain

Other

Category

untagged

Date

May 2023

Source

AuditVault

EVM Playground

Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync

evm-hack-analyzer

The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. No backend, no live RPC.

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Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 26043-h-09-rootbridgeagent-checkparamslibcheckparams-does-not-chec. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 26043-h-09-rootbridgeagent-checkparamslibcheckparams-does-not-chec_exp in the evm-hack-registry mirror.


Vulnerability classes: see taxonomy below

Reproduction: a self-contained Foundry PoC that compiles & runs in an isolated project with only forge-std — no fork, no RPC, no anvil_state. Full trace: output.txt. PoC: test/26043-h-09-rootbridgeagent-checkparamslibcheckparams-does-not-chec_exp.sol.


Key info#

ImpactHIGH — Deposit 10 USDC, mint 10 global hEther (mismatched pair) — fund theft
ProtocolMaia DAO
FindingCode4rena · reporter xuwinnie
Reporthttps://code4rena.com/reports/2023-05-maia
SourceAuditVault
StatusAudit finding — reproduced as a standalone local PoC.
Compiler^0.8.24 (PoC)

This is an audit finding, not a historical on-chain incident.


TL;DR#

  1. checkParams requires underlying exists and hToken is local, not that they pair.\n2. Attacker deposits USDC with hToken=hEther.\n3. Root mints 10 global hEther for 10 USDC.

Diagrams#

flowchart TD A[Setup vulnerable state] --> B[Trigger vulnerable path] B --> C[Harm asserted in run]

Impact#

Deposit 10 USDC, mint 10 global hEther (mismatched pair) — fund theft

Sources#


Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

Alerts & third-party analyses

  • Web3Sec X hacked database: search.
  • Rekt leaderboard: search.
  • Solodit incident search: search.

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