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Reproduced Exploit

Panther Protocol (Base): unopposed self-answered governance proposal captures the Safe

Aug 2026•Base•untagged•4 min read

Loss

~5.12M ZKP moved (pre-launch, no user funds lost)

Chain

Base

Category

untagged

Date

Aug 2026

Source

DeFiHackLabs

PoC & write-upPoC for your local evm-hack-analyzerDeFiHackLabs PoC · PantherBase_exp.sol

EVM Playground

Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync

evm-hack-analyzer

The attack is replayed in an in-browser EVM preloaded with the exact dumped fork state. The execution tree shows every call; step by Solidity line or by opcode across all depths — source, Stack, Memory, Storage, Balances (native / ERC-20 / NFT), Transient storage and Return value stay in sync. Click a tree node, opcode, or source line to jump. No backend, no live RPC.

Loading fork state…

Source & credit. Exploit reproduction, trace data, and analysis adapted from DeFiHackLabs by SunWeb3Sec — an open registry of reproduced on-chain exploits. The historical source/toolchain is unavailable; this entry is documentation only and claims no executable Forge PoC. Upstream DeFiHackLabs PoC: src/test/…/PantherBase_exp.sol.

Vulnerability classes: vuln/logic · vuln/access-control

Reproduction: a self-contained, faithful reconstruction of the incident's core bug — local deploy, no fork — both gates green (registry forge test PASS + browser Playground VERDICT: PASS). Basis: DeFiHackLabs PR #1209 (PantherBase_exp.sol, the upstream fork replay).

Key info#

Loss~5.12M ZKP moved (pre-launch, no user funds lost)
ChainBase
Vulnerable contract0xce01759b… (Finding #2026: RealityModule)
Bug classFinding #2026: RealityModule

Root cause#

The Zodiac Reality.eth governance module allows a fully permissionless path with no safeguard against an unopposed self-answered proposal: anyone can (1) submit a governance proposal, (2) bond a yes answer to their OWN proposal, and (3) execute it once finalized. No competing no bond is required inside the challenge window, so an unopposed self-answer finalizes after the 12h timeout and executes - capturing the fund-holding Safe's authority to move ~5.12M ZKP to the attacker. No code bug and no stolen key; the missing safeguard is that the Reality.eth module was not disabled while there was no active governance proposal.

SOLIDITY
    // @> VULN: anyone can bond a "yes" answer to their OWN question; there is no

Why it's exploitable here#

The Zodiac Reality.eth governance module allows a fully permissionless path with no safeguard against an unopposed self-answered proposal: anyone can (1) submit a governance proposal, (2) bond a yes answer to their OWN proposal, and (3) execute it once finalized. No competing no bond is required inside the challenge window, so an unopposed self-answer finalizes after the 12h timeout and executes - capturing the fund-holding Safe's authority to move ~5.12M ZKP to the attacker. No code bug and no stolen key; the missing safeguard is that the Reality.eth module was not disabled while there was no active governance proposal.

Attack path#

flowchart TD S0["Permissionless proposal"] S1["Self-answer 'yes'"] S2["Unopposed self-answer finalizes"] S3["Execution captures the avatar"] S4["Governance module boundary"] H["The Zodiac Reality.eth governance module allows a fully "] S0 --> S1 S1 --> S2 S2 --> S3 S3 --> S4 S4 --> H

Marked-line walkthrough (Playground)#

The EVM Playground pins each step to the exact executed source line:

  1. L83 — Permissionless proposal: Anyone can submit a governance question to the Reality.eth / Zodiac module.
  2. L91 — Self-answer 'yes': The attacker bonds a 'yes' answer to their OWN proposal.
  3. L92 — Unopposed self-answer finalizes: Root cause: no safeguard requires a competing bond or an active proposal, so an unopposed self-answer simply finalizes after the 12h timeout.
  4. L95 — Execution captures the avatar: Once finalized, executeProposal runs the attacker's arbitrary call on the fund-holding Safe.
  5. L102 — Governance module boundary: The module is the only caller the Safe trusts - capturing it captures the funds.
  6. L108 — Exploit driver: The reproduction proposes, self-answers, advances past the timeout and executes.
  7. L113 — Setup: the fund-holding Safe: Setup: the pre-launch Safe holds the governance-controlled ZKP.
  8. L116 — Setup: capture accounting: Setup: the exploit tracks the ZKP it moves out of the Safe.

PoC#

Registry (Foundry, local deploy — faithful reconstruction + harm-asserting test):

BASH
cd 2026-08-PantherBase_exp
forge test -vvv

The browser Playground replays the same synthetic opcode-for-opcode and measures the harm. Both gates are green (registry forge test PASS + Playground _verify-poc VERDICT: PASS).

Sources#

Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

  • No executable Forge reproduction is claimed; the historical source/toolchain was unavailable for this finding.
  • Upstream DeFiHackLabs PoC: PantherBase_exp.sol.

Alerts & third-party analyses

These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.