Origin — listing deposit can be withdrawn repeatedly

Source & credit. Reproduction of a public audit finding curated by AuditVault — the original finding: 17095-marketplace-ogn-balance-is-drainable-through-withdrawlisting. Standalone Foundry PoC and full write-up: 17095-origin-marketplace-repeated-withdraw_exp in the evm-hack-registry mirror.

Vulnerability classes: vuln/logic/state-update · vuln/logic/missing-check · vuln/logic/wrong-condition

Reproduction: Fully local synthetic; run forge test and inspect output.txt. The Playground bundle replays the same 17095-origin-marketplace-repeated-withdraw invariant.

Key info#

Field	Value
Loss	The marketplace's 100 OGN reserve is drained by replaying one 20 OGN withdrawal
Vulnerable contract	Marketplace (reconstructed)
Attacker EOA	0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 (synthetic caller)
Attack contract	Exploit
Attack tx	Local `Exploit.run()` call (no historical transaction)
Chain · block · date	Ethereum · local stub 0x1181d03 · 2022-01
Compiler	Solidity 0.8.35 (pragma ^0.8.24)
Bug class	vuln/logic/state-update · vuln/logic/missing-check · vuln/logic/wrong-condition

TL;DR#

withdrawListing authorizes the deposit manager but never marks the listing withdrawn. The same deposit can be transferred six times, draining the marketplace reserve.

Background#

AuditVault finding 17095-origin-marketplace-repeated-withdraw is an audit-time issue rather than a historical exploit. This write-up reduces the report to one state transition and keeps the claimed harm assertion executable offline.

The vulnerable code#

The minimized source is explicitly marked RECONSTRUCTED and preserves the report's blamed operation with an @> VULN marker in test/17095-origin-marketplace-repeated-withdraw.sol. It is byte-identical to the Playground synthetic source. No verified production source was available in this local checkout.

Root cause#

The function transfers listing.deposit without a consumed/withdrawn state transition.

Preconditions#

The affected protocol path is deployed; the attacker can reach the public operation described in the report. The synthetic removes unrelated integrations while preserving the state and authorization assumptions required for the finding.

Attack walkthrough#

Create a 20-unit listing, repeat withdrawListing six times, and recover 120 units against a 100-unit reserve.
The run() method requires the broken invariant and sets confirmed; the Forge trace records a passing test at output.txt:355.
The remediation is to validate the accounting/state transition before accepting the external call or to consume the one-time state.

Diagrams#

flowchart TD A["Attacker invokes public path"] --> B["Vulnerable state transition"] B --> C["Inconsistent accounting or revert"] C --> D["Reported protocol harm"]

Remediation#

Validate external addresses and returned balances before updating state, and make each one-time transition explicit. Add invariant tests covering zero/deflationary/epoch-boundary inputs.

How to reproduce#

BASH

cd 17095-origin-marketplace-repeated-withdraw_exp
forge test -vvv

The browser replay uses scripts/poc-configs/17095-origin-marketplace-repeated-withdraw.mjs and the same local-deploy Exploit contract.

Sources#

AuditVault finding
Trail of Bits report
Reduced local source: test/17095-origin-marketplace-repeated-withdraw.sol
Forge regression: test/17095-origin-marketplace-repeated-withdraw_exp.sol

Sources & further analysis#

Reproductions & code

Standalone PoC + full trace: 17095-origin-marketplace-repeated-withdraw_exp (evm-hack-registry mirror).
AuditVault finding: 17095-marketplace-ogn-balance-is-drainable-through-withdrawlisting.

Alerts & third-party analyses

Web3Sec X hacked database: search.
Rekt leaderboard: search.
Solodit incident search: search.

These dashboards index community alerts tweets, post-mortems, and independent write-ups. Reach them through the protocol name above to cross-check this reproduction against other analyses.

Source-level debugger — step opcodes and Solidity in sync